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Introduction 
At the present stage of historical progress, the ensuring of a healthy and safe activity of 
financial markets represents a must for each state in the world. The progressive pace of the 
economic globalization and the penetration of the exotic contracts into various sectors of the 
economy (as in the case of derivatives) may pose a new challenge for the regulators. The 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 has surfaced the limitations of the market, making them more 
prominent in the wake of the havoc that the crisis inflicted. After the crisis, effects of which 
are still felt even in the present days, Regulators have been forced to review the then existing 
regulations, and fill in the existing gaps.  
To the establishment of uniform standards of regulation of market was given a 
tremendously high importance on the international level. It became clear  that prior to the 
financial crisis, the poor regulation allowed the banks much more freedom than reasonable.  
Since then, many financial regulators around the globe have implemented lots of change, 
to ensure a healthy environment. The changes where concerned with Basel III that required 
a higher capital level for the banks as well as a higher liquidity ratio also enforcing banks to 
hold better-quality assets.  
The change was forced not only on the banks - the main cause of the financial crisis, 
but also on the financial markets. As European Commsion stipulates, the new changes “aimed 
at making financial markets more efficient, resilient and transparent, and at strengthening 
the protection of investors”.  On one hand the global market ensures the development of 
economy, and provides possibilities of retirement investment programs but, on the other 
hand, the uncertainty in the field of global finance may carry serious risks, since is the area 
of sharp and unpredictable up and downs. Here’s why it became indispensable to implement 
the much needed change and make the market efficient again.  
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Chapter 1 : The European Union – the fundamentals of regulations 
 
Since the founding of the European Union (hereinafter “EU”) - an aftermath of the II 
World War, besides its other goals such as stopping the bloody wars among neighbors, had 
to also ensure an economic cooperation between them.  This required the creation of a set of 
regulations – that subsequently evaluated into Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID) - whose purpose was explicitly to govern and harmonize this financial cooperation 
between members of the EU.  
For countries within EU, at a supranational scale, the functions to regulate the stock 
market are carried out by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), headed by the 
European Central Bank (ECB). “The European Central Bank, whose statutes were specified 
in the Maastricht Treaty, has much greater independence today than its members’ national 
central banks had [before the joining in] with respect to the determination of monetary policy 
and lending to the government […] but has higher transparency than did the national central 
banks of the twelve euro-area countries in 1998.” (Crowe & Meade, 2007) 
Together with the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) – who has 
taken on the task to adapt each country’s legislation to the directive, the European Agency 
for the securities market supervision (ESMA), which is subject to European the Commission 
and the EU Council.  
The history of legal regulation of the stock market in the formation of European 
integration could be divided into three periods: 
1) the initial period (1979-1988). 
2) the establishment of a single domestic securities market (1989-1998).;  
3) during the creation of a comprehensive regulatory framework (1999-2010.).  
 
The first directive, dedicated to the regulation of the stock market, was adopted by the 
Council of Europe in 1979. In 1989, it was first adopted the Directive in accordance with the 
new procedure and the authority established by the Single European Act; further 
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development of the process in the second period due to the Maastricht Treaty that declared 
as its aim to be completing the creation of the single market for goods and services. In 1999 
was approved the Action Plan in the sphere of financial services, which critically assesses 
the state of the securities market in the EU and provides a set of measures for the development 
of this market; all further progress in this direction is associated with the implementation of 
the Plan in the framework of the Lamfalussy process 1; 
Nonetheless, the prototype of today’s regulations was the Investment Services Directive 
(ISD), that has provided a healthy legislative framework for the European Area in the 
investment domain.  
1.1 Investment Services Directive (ISD) 
 
Adopted in 1993, the directive Nr. 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services 
in the securities field, a.k.a Investment Services Directive (hereinafter “ISD”) had 
represented the conclusion of a critical chapter in the new realities of the EU, and has been 
described as “granting a passport for EU securities firms to conduct cross-border operations 
anywhere in the EU based on a license issued by their respective home states.”  (Manning 
Gilbert Warren III, 1994). The clashes of different regulations and business cultures of twelve 
member states2 had brought up the questions of creating one set of rules and provisions to 
simplify the trade between them. The EU Council of Ministers3 had, if not solved, then at 
least side-stepped the existing, at the time, problems, and adopted on May 10, 1993 the 
aforementioned document with its major provisions for all Member states being: 
                                                          
1 It means that the MiFID is being adopted using a legislative approach known as the "Lamfalussy Process." It 
was named in the honor of the President of the Committee who first conceptualized and introduced it in 2001. 
"Lamfalussy" Directives are split into levels – the "level 1" Directive establishes the guiding principles of the 
legislation agreed in co-decision by EP/Council, the "level 2" implementing measures implemented by 
European Commission, and the third and fourth level. The advantage of this "split-level" approach is that it 
allows the Council and Parliament to focus on the key political decisions, while technical implementing details 
are worked through afterwards. This flexibility allows for more rapid and frequent adaptation of the legislation 
so that it can keep pace with market and technological developments.  
 
2 In 1993 the EU had been formed of 12 countries, with the subsequent joining, during the years, of another 16 
countries. As of the year 2016 the EU is formed of 28 member states, Croatia being the last one to join in 2013.   
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1. To reduce, or wholly eliminate the need for license requirement or authorizations 
among the states; 
2. allow the firms to freely operate across Europe with the authorization received 
from their home state, thus ensuring mutual recognition of the license by other 
states, without requesting any local regulatory approvals; 
3. establish standards and rules in order to ensure a healthy and sound financial 
environment; 
 
Thanks to this document all the major financial institutions were able to open their 
offices in other countries and provide their services abroad. However, with time going by, 
the increasing expansion and versatility of the market led to the need to create and 
implementation a more detailed regulation. 
The ISD had only represent the first step, as stipulated in many different studies, and 
although many of the scholars, who touched the subject of the ISD, stated that the directive 
at hand had a limited impact and success, it still managed to set the course toward bigger 
changes and toward regulatory harmony in the EU securities market at that time, still they 
specified that it was “merely a first step in integrating the securities markets and in achieving 
the goals of investor protection and efficient functioning of markets [and if] EU wants to 
reach full integration, it must develop a stronger foundation that encourages flexibility and 
a proactive approach to regulation.”  (Smith, 2000) 
ISD was perceived as a cornerstone for the EU regulation, but due to the fact was created 
in the era when the linkage between the markets was in seldom use, the level of ISD coverage 
might have been enough. The directive had lacked the provisions for investment advice, and 
an optimal level of investor protection. With the time going by, it was becoming more and 
more obvious the directive is failing to provide a clear enforcement and supervision within 
EU, thus requiring to be updated or substituted.  
 The most significant steps in the development of the investment market were made in 
2002, when the EU Member States had initiated the convening of the conference to consider 
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ways to improve the quality of regulation in the finance sphere. The natural result of this was 
the development in 2004, the special directives in the field of finance.  
 
1.2  Toward MiFID – the process of implementation in Italy 
 
When speaking about MiFID, we have to bear in mind that we do not refer only to only 
one directive, but a directive that is built in levels: 
 First, in 2004, 21st April the Council together with the European Parliament are 
adopting the Directive nr. 2004/39/EC (that will be recognized as first level), 
named The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, usually addressed to as 
MiFID, which was an overall the next step in the reaching the regulatory 
harmony to which the European Union Member States were struggling to arrive. 
It came with the purpose to substitute the previously adopted Investment Services 
Directive (ISD) in order to strengthen and reinforce the efficiency of financial 
markets in the EU area. 
 
 Two years later, 2006 on 10th of August, it subsequently adopts the Directive nr. 
2006/73 / EC that is named the Implementing Directive (second level), carrying 
down the measures for the implementation of the first level directive nr. 
2004/39/EC. The last directive was adopted with the role of specifying the 
technical measures and requirements together with operating procedure for the 
companies.  
The last directive was adopted with the role of specifying the technical measures 
and requirements together with operating procedure for the companies. 
On the same day, together with the directive, it was issued also Implementing 
Regulation Nr. 1287/2006 that defined the modality of implementing the MiFID 
directive in the domains like: market transparency, requirements for admission 
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of the financial instruments to being traded on the market, requirements 
concerning certification etc.  
The Regulations was applicable in every state member, and will prevail in the 
case of a conflict with the National laws.  
 
 The third level, was the work of The Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR) that working together with national authorities, has issued in 
January 2007 general as well as specific principles for the adoption and 
implementation of the directive. The deadline for the implementation of MiFID 
in for each member state was fixed for 31st of January 2007.  
 
Italian authorities had subsequently pressed on with the implementation of the directive, 
and until the end of March, same year; the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance already 
publishes the modification in the Consolidated Law on Finance (it. Testo Unico della Finanza  
- abrv. TUF).  Two months after the Italian Parliament charges the Government to make the 
necessary amendments for the proper enforcement of MiFID, assigning Bank of Italy, 
together with CONSOB4, to supervise the correct enactment of the later.  
As such, on November 1st 2007 the two Financial authorities had issued specific 
regulations and provisions for the successful implementation European Directive on 
Investment Services (MiFID) in Italian legal frameworks. 
 
 
1.3  The reasoning behind MiFID implementation.  
 
 MiFID represents a comprehensive document who’s aim was “to improve the 
competitiveness of EU financial markets by creating a single market for investment services 
                                                          
4 Bank of Italy, together with CONSOB had defined, under Art.5 of Consolidated Law on Finance a “protocol” 
that indicates to each supervisory authority their tasks, and how to conclude them. The protocol is intended to 
guarantee the coordination of supervisory authorities, in order to reduce the burdens of the intermediaries.  
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and activities, and ensuring a high degree of harmonized protection for investors in financial 
instruments, such as shares, bonds, derivatives and various structured products”5. It 
represented a new legal framework, implemented in order to substitute the outdated ISD, 
extending its regulation to the products not covered by ISD, strengthening its the latter’s 
provisions and introducing regulations for the areas not covered yet.  
ISD has permitted the countries to use the “concentration rule” which stated that the 
retail orders are bound to be processed on a regulated market, which had a tremendous impact 
on the competition. MiFID’s provisions had canceled this rule, allowing regulated market 
and other trading platforms to compete for the order flow.  
The Directive also provided information on various arguments, such as: regulating the 
free movement of capital and investment within the EU, delineating the requirements for 
organized trading platforms and over-the-counter (OTC) trading systems and other, obliging 
financial institutions to include a wide range of regulations – to which they are obliged to 
adhere to when providing investment services – as well as raise awareness of the investors 
themselves. 
Each of the EU member-states may set their own supervisory institution and set their 
own rules and requirements, but the activities are bound to be consistent the MiFID Directive. 
The document also provides harmonized rules for the three countries not part of 
European Union but part of European Economic Area - Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein. 
The requirements of MiFID can be summarized as follows:  
 Developments in market structures and organizational requirement 
With the ever progressing financial world, it shortly became obvious that Investment 
Services Directive adopted so far as 1993 was extremely outdated. For example, the 
same “passport system”, first settled by ISD, was in desperate need of an update and 
new rules for the monitoring of firm that use the passport, in order to erase barriers 
in extra-national trading and ensure supplementary competition.  
                                                          
5Source:  http://ec.europa.eu  
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Moreover, with the rise of alternative trading techniques and functionalities, it 
became acutely necessary to substitute the ISD, and provide a more updated, adapted 
and firm set of regulation.  
 
 Systematic Internalization & Pre-Trade and Post-Trade Transparency. 
It is necessary to have a proactive analysis of the transparency regime for instruments 
other then shares.  
 
 Best execution 
MiFID has also set up provisions demanding the banks or other financial institutions 
to ensure that the orders received from clients would be executed at most favorable 
and profitable terms, and reach the best possible result.  
 
 Client classification 
The directive identifies 3 types of clients: professional, retail and eligible 
counterparty. The degree of protection that the client enjoys is determined by its 
classification.  
 
 Transaction Reporting 
MiFID enlarges the requirements for reporting the transaction of all instruments that 
are admitted to be traded on Regulated Market.  
 
 Conflicts of Interest 
The directive requires each company to take into account the possibility of occurrence 
of a conflict of interest between the company and its clients. It is required to take any 
steps, within reason, as to prevent such situation. 
In the instance that situation occurred, it is expected to have effective arrangements 
as how to manage the situation.  
 
  Client Adequacy and Appropriateness 
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The companies operating in the field of investments advisory and portfolio 
management, are henceforth required to perform a “suitability test” so as to assess, 
besides the financial objectives of the client, also the level of experience and 
knowledge in the matter at hand.  
For any other services, companies are bound to ensure that their products/services are 
fitting not only the client’s necessities, but also its familiarity with the subject.  
 
As stated, MiFID is a key part of a complex system, vital for regulating the processes in 
the world market and that is bound to also be consistent with all relevant worldwide standards 
and regulations. Within a relatively short period of time in the European market it has been 
a positive dynamics of development. The most prominent is a significant reduction in the 
cost of financial services, resulting in greater market attractiveness for investment. In 
addition, there was finally idea of how a regulated market should actually look like, which 
contributed to the development of new regulations aimed at improving the performance of 
financial transactions.  
The interactions of market participants became more transparent, moreover that they 
were provided with the necessary level of legal protection. The principle of action of MiFID 
was to create a strong market to attract investors, which is only possible with full 
transparency of transactions on the exchange. 
Disregarding the fact that MiFID was actually expected with a bit of criticism, it did in 
fact represented a very important step in market legislation, substituting 25 different 
regulatory regimes with a harmonized set of rules (Casey, Lanoo 2006). Some have argued 
that, even if it had a tremendous impact on the investors, not only wholesale, but retail ones 
as well, it lacked the cost-benefit analysis in the phase of preparation of MiFID’s 
implementation, and the one that was done by other institutions has still proved to have been 
inefficient. (Skinner, Knight, 2007 p. 207).  
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) was indeed necessary to be performed in order to better 
understand and forecast the repercussions of such an important change within the regulation 
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system. The Commission stated that the CBA was not required to be performed when the 
work on the level one Directive has started. Moreover, assessing the impact of MiFID as a 
stand-alone legislation has proven to be very difficult, if not impossible in such a complex 
market. Nonetheless, in November, 2002, London Economics6 has performed a major study 
that was able to quantify the major benefits for the macro-environment, and the benefits were 
quite positive, although the beneficial effect of the regulations integration and modification 
were deemed “positive but underestimated”, hinting that the effects were much more 
successful than forecasted7.  
Later, in 2010, the company London Economics were commissioned by City of London, 
to perform a research for better understanding MiFID’s impact, and the results showed that 
“the macroeconomic outcomes expected by the 2002 London Economics study may well have 
been largely realized. Overall, MiFID is estimated to have raised the long-run level of EU 
GDP (at constant prices) by about 0.7% to 0.8% percent.” (London Economics, 2010) 
Skinner and Knight stated that MiFID had its own shortcomings. They argue in their 
book “The Future of Investing in Europe's Markets after MiFID” (2007) that the levels of 
protection differ across EU. They make the example of UK regulation, that will be enacted 
whenever a problem of investment arises, but only in the cases when the product was bought 
or sold through a company that’s quartered in the UK. Whenever the company is situated 
outside the UK, there might be problems concerning which of the countries’ regulation will 
step in. Even if under MiFID there are some arrangements put in place, they are quite “loose” 
comparing to UK regulations, which might considerable breach the financial safety of an 
inexperienced investor. The principle of equivalence will not necessarily bring the benefit of 
the benefit of same level protection in all EU countries. 
                                                          
6 “The Report about Macro-Economic Impact of of EU Financial Markets” (2002) has been performed together 
with PricewaterhouseCoopers and Oxford Economic Forecasting, who presented positive results to the 
integration of European capital market and make it “whole”.  
 
7 European Commission - Press Releases, MEMO/07/439 of 29th of October 2007, Brussels.  
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On the bigger scale, after the adoption and implementation of MiFID, there could be 
noticed a positive trend in the EU market development. Here are some of the positive aspects 
of the implementation MiFID requirements: 
1) MiFID has contributed to the creation of a single market, so that the participants were 
given more favorable conditions; 
2) The stakeholders, after being consulted8, had stated that the implementation has 
beneficially impacted the trading costs, and increased the pre-trade transparency. 
Nonetheless, in their opinion, the best execution rule has proven to be poorly 
effective.  
3) As expected – it has increased competition among the investment service companies.  
4) It increased investor’s protection, particularly the retail clients.  
5) Better level of protection of investments – due to the fact that organizations were 
required to sort out the clientele into certain categories, they needed to know the level 
of clients’ knowledge of the financial sector, which has served as the main factor in 
providing a more appropriate service to the clients.  
 




Traditionally, the Italian stock market was poorly regulated. However, at the end of the 
1980s, Italy, the same as in other European countries, has carried out a regulatory reform. Its 
aim was to make the stock market meet modern requirements. Under this reform was created 
                                                          
8 In the London Report “Understanding the Impact of MiFID in the Context of Global and National Regulatory 
Innovations” stated above updated with the post-MiFID period analysis year 2009 (excluding 2008 due to the 
fact that the year at hand was highly instable due to the crisis), specified that, in order to complement the 
empirical data, was conveyed a survey of MiFID impact on the investors. The results showed that overall the 
stakeholders positively influenced by the Directive implementation.  
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the Italian Commission for the Stock Market (it. Commissione nazionale per le societa e la 
borsa; hereinfater “CONSOB”).  
CONSOB was included of an important partcipiant in regulating the financial sector of 
the European regulatory process. Under the articles of Law and Constitution has been issued 
the „Consolidated Law on Financial Intermediation” (CLFI) (it. Testo Unico della Finanza), 
with the intent to harmonize and bring together all the normative and provisions previously 
adopted during the years.   
 
CONSOB works together with Bank of Italy (Banca d'Italia) which, in addition to 
performing standard functions of a country’s central bank, also plays an important regulatory 
role in the financial market of Italy, being charged with overlooking the activities of market 
participants and assuring a good functioning of the market.  
Its main purposes were to monitor the implementation of market participant’s legislation, 
thus ensure “transparency and correct behavior by financial market participants”, being 
authorized to request market participants to provide information. In case of some doubts or 
breach of regulations, it was also authorized to inspect and sanction the market participants.  
Annually CONSOB reports on its activities to the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Italy. 
The main law regulating the activities of the stock market has become the Consolidated 
Law on Finance of 24 February 1998, legislative decree Nr. 58 which summarized the 
legislative framework for all the changes and concerns  all the activity on the stock market, 
the types of investment institutions (intermediaries), issuance of securities, corporate 
„It [CLFI] provides comprehensive regulation of securities intermediaries, financial 
markets and central depositaries of financial instruments and issuers. The provisions 
governing intermediaries confirm the principle of assigning supervisory responsibilities 
to objective, entrusting the Bank of Italy with safeguarding financial stability and 
CONSOB with ensuring transparent and proper conduct. The bank of Italy is also 
charged with defining the prudential rules for limiting risk that investments undertaking 
must follow” 
Bank of Italy, 1999 p.171 cited by Howell, 2004, p. 165 
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governance, securities trading, regulatory authorities, the organization of the stock exchange 
etc. This law included the main provisions of the EU ISD directive. 
Until the early 1990s, the regulatory system was of an institutional nature: the Bank of 
Italy controlled the banks, CONSOB - securities companies, ISVAP9 (Istituto per la vigilanza 
sulle assicurazioni private e di interesse collettivo) - the insurance companies, the 





After the adoption of MiFID, as specified before, CONSOB and Bank of Italy were both 
charged with issuing regulations in order to implement MiFID’s provisions in Italy. These 
provisions entered into force on 2007, November 2nd.  
Particularly CONSOB, with Bank of Italy’s consent, approved regulations concerning 
the two authorities, for assuring a correct MiFID enactment. The arrangements were more of 
a procedural and organizational nature, also concerning the conflicts of interest.  
Separately, Bank of Italy had touched the subject of regulating the Minimum Capital 
Requirements and Italian investment firms’ foreign operations (it. Società di Intermediatione 
Mobiliare SIMs). 
CONSOB has gone forward adopting resolution no. 16191 of 29/10/2007 on the 
financial market (substituting Regulation n. 11768 of 23 December 1998), and resolution no. 
161910 of 29/10/2007 (amending Regulation nr: 11522 of 1st of July 1998) issuing the 
“Intermediaries Regulation” which ensured coverage of financial market, intermediaries, 
                                                          
9 ISVAP was a public Italian institution founded in 1982, that has replaced the Ministry of Industry taking over 
his duties as a supervisory institution who’s tasks was to oversee the private insurances, brokers and insurance 
agents on the rules of Legislative Decree n. 209/05 – also called Insurance Code.  Afterwards, under the decree 
nr. 95 of 6th of July, 2012 was substituted with Istituto per la vigilanza sulle assicurazioni  (IVASS).  
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non-EU investments firms and SIMs authorization. The regulation furnished provisions for 
EU companies that operated and offer investment services on Italian ground.  
Nowadays it is stated that the regulation is functional, instead of carrying a more 
institutional character, due to the fact that the market is supervised by many agencies at once. 
Trying to characterize the modern regulation system of Italy, compared to other important 
EU members, we can conclude that it’s a system of diarchy10 – with Bank of Italy and 
CONSOB holding the two positions. As a matter of fact, art. 5 of Consolidated Law on 
Finance (it. T.U.F) specifies that the two authorities are not only bound to collaborate but 
also to operate in a coordinated manner as to reduce the burden fallen upon authorized 
persons. 
Following the MiFID directive, CONSOB has outlined a very articulated and thorough 
supervision for ensuring that the companies comply with the newly adopted standards when 
providing investment services. It had a particular regard to the financial services distribution.  
In years preceding the implementation of MiFID much of the litigation in the field of 
investment services related to the carelessness with which the principle of “adequacy” of 
financial investments was treated. Only after the implementing the Directive that the rule has 
undergone significant changes, having to now distinguish between "Suitability" and 
“Appropriateness" of operations.  
                                                          
10 In the Consolidated Law on Finance could be noticed a constantly repeated phrase, stating that certain actions 
are carried out "by the Bank of Italy, after consulting Consob" or " Consob, after consulting the Bank of Italy".  
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Chapter 2 : From MiFID I to MiFID II 
 
Even if the first Directive had overall improved the situation on the investment market 
and has managed to remove the barriers in Europe, with the crisis that hit in 2008 it became 
obvious that the first Directive has become inefficient. As stated by the European 
Commission -  “while MiFID created competition […] and brought more choice and lower 
prices for investors, shortcomings were exposed in the wake of the financial crisis” 11.  The 
financial crisis12 has managed to expose regime’s weaknesses - the poorly-efficient market 
transparency, its lack in the non-equities market, and was in need for revision of existing 
laws which became too old for the all progressing market 
The impact of the subprime mortgage crisis had a tremendous impact which 
undermined the stability in the markets, had significantly affected the investors’ confidence 
in  the system, such that in order to ensure that the laws and the progress are walking hand-
in-hand, the European Commission decided to take action an, with the participation of the G-
2013  members, have made some changes to the existing at the time Directive. Afterwards, 
with several innovations, the new Directive became a kind of a “follower” to the previous 
document. 
Timeline 
On 20th of October, 2011, the European Commission had published the new proposals 
for the new Directive, and new Regulation - MiFID II (Market in Financial Instruments 
Directive II 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council) and MiFIR 
(Regulation Nr. 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council). After 3 years, in 
2014 on 15th of April the Council of the European Union has adopted the final (Level 1) texts 
                                                          
11 Source:  http://ec.europa.eu  
12 “The global financial crisis of 2007–2008 was the most severe since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Some 
of the world’s best-known financial institutions collapsed or were nationalized, while many others survived 
only with massive state support” Its main cause was the “opacity of OTC derivatives, and the concentration of 
risk in large and interconnected firms” – source:  
13   G20 is an informal group of 19 countries and the European Union, with representatives of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
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for the two documents. In June the two texts were published in the Official Journal and on 
2nd of July they entered into force. ESMA has been bound to provide and publish Guidelines 
and Technical Standards, until finally on 28th of September 2015 it submited the Final Report 
to the Commission, containing the final draft of 28 technical standards, including 27 
regulatory technical standards (RTS) and one implementing technical standard (ITS). During 
the years the implementation of the new Directive and Regulation into the national laws has 
been set as of 3rd of July, 2017. As for today the application of MiFID II and MiFIR had been 
postponed until 3rd of January 2018.  
Structure 
Just as MiFID I, the second directive is structured in levels: 
1. Level 1 is known as the primary legislation, which came in force in 2014, July, 
being represented by two distinctive documents explained above – MiFID and 
MiFIR – widely known as the Directive and Regulation. Altogether, these 
documents could be invoked as “MiFID II”. The Regulation (MiFIR) does not 
need to be implemented separately in each EU member state, since it is 
enforceable by default, quite the opposite from the Directive (MiFID II) – 
where all the state members are bound to adopt the new legislation into their 
own laws and regulations.  
 
2. Level 2 often referred to as the “detail level”, is quite crucial for healthy 
functioning of the new legislation, mainly because it contains the technicalities 
and measures that supplement the newly updated framework. It’s represented 
by two forms of documents:  
 The Technical standards – that are first outlined by ESMA and, later 
on, approved by European Commission. They are subsequently divided 
into two types of standards:  
- Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) 
- Implementing Technical Standards (ITS) 
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  and the Delegated acts -  this type of measures are initially outlined by 
the EC, with ESMA’s advice, being as well divided into 2 types: 
- Delegated Directives (DD) 
- Delegated Regulations (DR) 
The Delegated Regulations, being the core of MiFIR, have direct 
force, meanwhile the Delegated Directives are subject to 
transposition into national jurisdiction by each state-member.  
3. Last, Level 3, often referred to as “guidance level” represents the 
recommendations from ESMA, due to the intricacy of the new frameworks, and 
possible future discrepancies that might arise, the third level provides a sort of 
guidance, and answer to possible questions.  
 
Purpose 
Official Journal of the European Union defines the new Directive and Regulation 
purposes as follows:   
 
The new Directive and Regulation has brought forth a great number of changes, in the 
wake of the 2008 financial crisis.  
As specified above the changes were focused upon strengthening the financial 
framework of European Union, allowing the country members to have a healthy investment 
environment. It has made a particular reference to the following issues:  
“The new legal framework governs the requirements applicable to investment firms, 
regulated markets, data reporting services providers and third country firms providing 
investment services or activities in the Union. It harmonizes the position limits regime for 
commodity derivatives to improve transparency, to support orderly pricing and to prevent 
market abuse. It also introduces rules on high-frequency algorithmic trading and improves the 
oversight of financial markets by harmonizing administrative sanctions. Building on the rules 
already in place, the new legal framework also strengthens the protection of investors by 
introducing robust organizational and conduct requirements.”  
Official Journal of European Union, 2016 
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a) It establishes a framework for the structure of the market, covering pre-existing 
spaces, ensuring that trading is carried out mainly on regulated platforms.  
b)  They acted upon the so called “dark markets” or “dark pool” trading14, thus 
trading outside the regulated market,  on the markets set up either by banks or 
specialized investment firms. This markets flourished under the MiFID I 
framework, that contained nothing to keep this type of trading at bay, a 
shortcoming that was argued to have triggered the global financial crisis.  
c) They have focused on the derivatives regulation, especially those that were, 
until then excluded, forcing the contracts to be traded on a regulated market 
(RM), multilateral trading facility (MTF) or organized trading facilities (OTF).  
d) MiFID II sets increased requirements for transparency of the equity market and, 
for the first time in the history of financial regulation, transparency principle 
also applies to instruments where the underlying asset - are borrowed funds, 
thus derivatives. The transparency regime was expanded for the pre- and post-
trade period, extending it to non-equity instruments, despite the fact that 
according to their features might be possible a pre-trade transparency waiver 
for large orders.  
e) Strengthening the process of information consolidation in order to reduce the 
negative effects of the trade fragmentation.  
Despite the fact the new regulation is brought to change the present one, and to bring 
order in the investment market, its implementation might be quite difficult. The Directive’s 
implementation was postponed a couple of times, due to the fact the companies are having 
difficulties to adjust under the new requirements.  
                                                          
14 “Dark pool” trading -  it’s an enormous unregulated financial market (platform) that gives the opportunity 
to trade without disclosing any information (anonymously) and without publishing prices or quantity of the 
traded instruments. Dark pool trading is frequently used by large traders (investors) for setting huge deals in 
total anonymity. Besides the benefit of anonymity, the dark pool traders also are able to diminish costs and 
avoid the market-impact.  
More about the “dark pool” trading – please refer to Scott Patterson’s book “Dark Pools: The Rise of the 
Machine Traders and the Rigging of the U.S. Stock Market” (2013) 
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On the 10th of February 2016, the European Commission has decided to postpone the 
date of application of the new Directive’s package  for an extra year15, fixing the deadline to 
3rd of January 2018. This decision was taken as to give the banks and investment companies 
enough time to prepare for the new market rules. Not only the regulators, but also all market 
participants have to implement and follow an exceptionally difficult set of rules and they 
would require more time to be able to meet them. 
As specified by the EU the decision was taken “The reason for the extension lies in the 
complex technical infrastructure that needs to be set up for the MiFID II package to work 
effectively. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has to collect data from 
about 300 trading venues on about 15 million financial instruments. To achieve this result, 
ESMA must work closely with national competent authorities and the trading venues 
themselves. However, the European Commission was informed by ESMA that neither 
competent authorities, nor market participants, would have the necessary systems ready by 
3 January 2017, the date by which the MiFID II package was initially scheduled to become 
operational. In light of these exceptional circumstances and in order to avoid legal 
uncertainty and potential market disruption, an extension was deemed necessary.”. (EC, 
2016) 
 
2.1   Main changes 
 
The European Commission defines a list of 7 main key elements that changed under 
the new legislation. All of the main key elements are presented below:  
1. Market structure framework: trading venues -  RM, MTF and OTF 
In relation to shares and financial instruments whose underlying asset is a debt capital, 
they introduced an obligation to be traded only on regulated trading platforms. Investment 
                                                          
15 The new MiFID II package was expected to enter into application already on 3rd of January 2017. This was 
the day set by the European Commission to for the new Directive to become operational. This date was 
subsequently postponed due to extremely difficult package requirements, such that the neither the companies 
nor the regulators would’ve succeeded to be ready for in time.  
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companies using an internal matching system16 performing customer orders for shares, 
depositary receipts, and funds traded on the stock exchange certificates and other similar 
financial instruments on a multilateral basis, etc. must obtain the status of Multilateral 
Trading Facility (hereinafter “MTF”).  These rules are intended to establish the same 
standards for RM and MTF. 
Outside the two previous markets, they also created the Organized Trading Facility 
(hereinafter “OTF’), the third type of multilateral system, where the buying and selling can 
interact in the system, and are able to enter in a contract. OTF markets will be limited in 
trading only the derivatives, structured finance product, bonds and emission allowances 
being prohibited to trade in equity instruments.  
Each of the system is bound to have similar market monitoring and organizational 
provisions, meanwhile their transparency regimes would have to be adjusted to the specific 
instruments they’re trading in. There’s an important detail though: when trading on the OTF 
the investor has to explain why he wants his trade to be executed on the OTF, and nor RM 
or MTF instead.  
Key differences between trading venues: 
 RM MTF OTF 







Non-discretionary Non-discretionary Discretionary 




Prohibited Prohibited Permitted in some 
cases with client 
consent 
                                                          
16 Internal matching system – systems constituted inside investment companies or banks, under which the buy 
and sell orders are matched inside this system,  
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Own account trading Prohibited Prohibited Permitted with respect 
to illiquid sovereign 
debt instruments 
Table 2 1  Key differences between trading venues 
Source: Linklaters. 2014 17 
 
 Neutrality of the OTF operators should be ensured by limiting their ability to use their 
own capital. However, this provision is still too “broad” for use in practice, giving the 
opportunity to be omitted or worked-around, and is expected to be redefined in the future. 
This vagueness is said to be a deliberate assumption, which should provide a temporary 
flexibility to work with complex financial instruments such as derivatives on securities with 
fixed income. It is believed that in the future OTF have become leaders in the number of 
transactions with the advanced financial instruments, such as futures and options. At the 
moment, the main task of OTF is making transparency in transactions in the financial 
markets. Together with prohibiting the operators to use their own capital, they were also 
given the discretion in decision-making related with order execution.  
Besides, the new Directive also revises the systematic internaliser (IS) regulation, 
introduced and addressed previously under the MiFID I regulation in 2007. A “systematic 
internaliser” under the first directive was explained as follows:  
 
Under the new Directive the definition of a SI does not change much in essence, but 
there’s a slight difference that now a SI represents a company that trades outside the 
“regulated market, an MTF or an OTF without operating a multilateral system;”18. One of 
                                                          
17 Global law firm “Linklaters” paper on “MiFID II: The new market structure paradigm”, 2014 
18 MiFID II – Article 4 (1) prov. 20  
 
“‘Systematic internaliser’ means an investment firm which, on an organised, 
frequent and systematic basis, deals on own account by executing client orders 
outside a regulated market or an MTF;” 
MiFID I - Article 4 (7) 
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the things differentiating the SI from the other trading venues is the fact that it can execute 
the orders received from clients against its own capital.  SI were defined by MiFID II not as 
a trading venues (such as RM, MTF, or OTF) but as a counter party:  
 
For instance, trading platforms where trading occurs always against a single investment 
firm is to be defined as a Systematic internaliser, only if it complies with the clauses specified 
by the directive. On the opposite, a platform where the traders interact with one another for 
the same instrument will be defined as multi-dealer/multilateral platform.  
Schematically the new market framework could be defined as follows:  
  
Figure 2.1 Market Structure post-MiFID II/MiFIR 
Source: CONSOB19 
 
2. Equity market transparency 
                                                          




• Over-the-counter Markets (OTC)
• Systematic internaliser (SI)
Multilateral 
Systems
• Regulated Markets (RM)
• Multilateral Trading Facility  (MTF)
• Organized Trading Facility (OTF)
“… any bilateral trading carried out with clients should be relevant and 
criteria should be developed for the identification of investment firms required to 
register as systematic internaliser. While trading venues are facilities in which 
multiple third party buying and selling interests interact in the system, a systematic 
internaliser should not be allowed to bring together third party buying and selling 
interests in functionally the same way as a trading venue.” 
MiFID II – Recital 17 
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The transparency issue was also addressed within the MiFID I, although some consider 
it to be only a fraction of the real issue. The decision to address the transparency topic more 
in-depth was mainly influenced by the events of summer 2007, when the subprime crisis took 
its origins. Due to the fact that the traded instruments did not fall under the regulation, such 
outcomes20 became possible.  
The new legislation is expected to increase the market transparency, to both class of 
assets: equity as well as non-equity ones, (such as derivatives and bonds).  
Article 3 of MiFIR stipulates that 
 
 
Despite the fact transparency requirements are identical for the RM, MTF or OTF, they 
will be calibrated depending on the type of instruments being negotiated, and the type of 
“trading systems including order-book, quote-driven, hybrid and periodic auction trading 
systems.” 21.   
Article 4 addresses the “Waivers for equity instruments” issue, specifying that the 
competent authorities may waive the obligation for market operators and investment firms 
only in strictly defined cases22, but are forced, before granting a waiver to inform and give 
explanation of the regulator (ESMA or other competent authority) about the waive they 
                                                          
20 For more about the financial crisis and its impact please read “Real Effects of the 2007-08 Financial Crisis 
around the World” by Hui Tong (IMF) and Shang-Jin Wei (Columbia University and NBER)  
 
21 MiFIR - Article 3 (1) to Article. 3 (2) 
22 MiFIR - Article 4 (1) a-d   
“Market operators and investment firms operating a trading venue shall make 
public current bid and offer prices and the depth of trading interests at those prices 
which are advertised through their systems for shares, depositary receipts, ETFs, 
certificates and other similar financial instruments traded on a trading venue. That 
requirement shall also apply to actionable indication of interests. Market operators 
and investment firms operating a trading venue shall make that information 
available to the public on a continuous basis during normal trading hours” 
MiFIR – Article 3 
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would presume to use and also provide all the information about the waiver. The regulators 
are then given the right to withdraw the waiver if they see fit.23  
 
3. Strengthened Supervisory Powers  
The G20 multiple times expressed their concerns about the volatility and speculation 
in the commodity derivatives, and the impact it has on prices. The European Commission 
recognized the effects of such instruments and riskiness and stated that “the Commission is 
now coming forward with a proposal to ensure that derivatives trading becomes more safe, 
sound and efficient.”24. Since then they decided to increase transparency for the commodity 
derivatives25, giving the regulators the right to ban or limit the use, distribution and marketing 
of certain instruments. The companies will be, hence-forth, obliged to prove that the trading 
activities are indeed ancillary for their business. ESMA is charged with providing a 
calculation algorithm for giving the competent authorities a system under which to put limits 
on position and also introduce position management controls, as delineated Article 2 (4): 
As specified before, ESMA will also be bound to provide the list of eligible instruments 
                                                          
23 MiFIR - Article 4 (4)   to Article. 4 (5) 
 
24 European Commission Press Release “Measures on derivatives, Credit Default Swaps and short selling in 
financial markets”, Wednesday 15 September 2010 
 
25 The term commodity is defined by MiFIR, which makes reference to point (44)(c) of Article 4(1) of MiFID 
II which states that the commodity derivative is “any other securities giving the right to acquire or sell any such 
transferable securities or giving rise to a cash settlement determined by reference to transferable securities, 
currencies, interest rates or yields, commodities or other indices or measures;”  
“ESMA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify […] the criteria 
for establishing when an activity is to be considered to be ancillary to the main business 
at a group level.” 
MiFID II - Article 2 (4) 
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derivatives through a technical standard, and under the MiFID II Regulation it is also 
bound to pay its attention the derivatives previously excluded26 from the regulation.  
 
4. Increased competition 
The European Commission recognizes the competition in the trading and clearing of 
financial instruments to be a cornerstone of a healthy functioning of the trading market, hence 
it has decided to provide a non-discriminatory access regime as delineated bellow:  
 
 all the while abolishing any technical and legal restriction for any investment firms to 
join the RMs within the Union. MiFIR specify that all trading venues shall provide a non-
discriminatory acces to Central Counterparties (hereinafter “CCPs”), as follows:  
 
                                                          
26 It concerns mainly the energy derivatives. This type of contracts was excluded from the previous regulation, 
and with the implementation of the new Directive, which made a too narrow definition and a “too strict approach 
in distinguishing physical products from financial instruments.” In their letter EURELECTRIC, the Association 
of the Electricity Industry in Europe, has expressed its concerns about the impact that this might have on the 
energy market, which could “undermine any ambitions of the Energy Union to reinforce competitiveness, 
sustainability and security of supply [and also] trigger unintended consequences”. (Eurelectric letter to 
European Commissioners of 10 April 2015). Until the 1st of January the European Commission will elaborate 
a report, together with ESMA, about the impact that MiFID might have on Energy market 
“All trading venues, namely regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities 
(MTFs), and OTFs, should lay down transparent and non-discriminatory rules 
governing access to the facility.” 
MiFID II – Recital 14 
“For effective competition between trading venues for derivatives, it is essential 
that trading venues have non-discriminatory and transparent access to CCPs.  
Non-discriminatory access to a CCP should mean that a trading venue has the right 
to non-discriminatory treatment in terms of how contracts traded on its platform are 
treated in terms of collateral requirements and netting of economically equivalent 
contracts and cross-margining with correlated contracts cleared by the same CCP, and 
non-discriminatory clearing fees.” 
MiFIR – Recital 28 
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Later (Recitals 38-40) on the Regulation provides with various details on the CCPs 
admission to the venues, specifying that the CCPs would be allowed  only if “if certain access 
criteria specified in regulatory technical standards are met.”27. Besides, the CCPs will now 
have to accept to clear transactions that “transactions executed in different trading venues, 
to the extent that those venues comply with the operational and technical requirements 
established by the CCP, including the risk management requirements.”28.  
Article 38 of MiFIR delineates that the third-country CCPs could gain access to a Union 
trading venue only if they would be set in the country which the MiFID II Directive has 
deemed appropriate in terms of “effective equivalent system for the recognition of trading 
venues”29.  
 
5. Controls for Algorithmic Trading and High Frequency Trading 
It has been discussed a lot lately about the influence of the technologies on the trading 
market. The part of High Frequency Trading and Algorithmic Trading was in reality a 
cornerstone of MiFID’s II purpose, as has it been the focus of global regulatory attention for 
the past years. It is undoubtedly that the fast pace of technological progress rises concerns 
for the healthy functioning of the market. The literature has only begun to provide evidence 
about potential problems and risks of such manner of trading only after the events of 6th of 
May 2010, the date of an unmotivated collapse of the Dow Jones, S&P 500 and Nasdaq 
Imposite index. This collapse has caused the Flash Crash30 - an important enough event to 
bring into public’s view the problems arising from HFT.  
                                                          
27 MiFIR – Recital 38 
28 MiFIR – Recital 38-39 
29 MiFIR – Article 28 (1) d 
 
30 The Flash Crash – a stock market crash that that took place on 6th of May, 2010. It has started at 14:32 and 
has lasted almost 36 minutes, during which period the S&P 500, Dow Jones Industrial Average and Nasdaq 
Composite had careened down and subsequently rebounded causing such big companies like General Electric 
and Proctor & Gamble to lose billions of dollars off their share prices, and casing massive panic on the market. 
The Dow Jones’ value has dropped for almost 9%, but the market subsequent rebounded settled at 3% lower at 
the closing time. The official report was issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission that stated that the Flash Crash was allegedly caused by a Waddell & Reed mutual 
fund, which had issued a sell order for $4.1bn, that started a “hot potato” effect.  
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There was heated academic debate over the HFT, but without reaching unique results. 
It was argued that HFT has as much of a negative impact on the market, as it does have some 
beneficial ones. Its positive impact could be recognized only after a careful examination of 
high-frequency trader’s strategies. Despite the aggressiveness of such strategies, the manner 
of trading does not prove to not have any impact on others traders’ profitability and also 
increases liquidity in the market31. However, under other aspects, it can raise doubts 
regarding the advantage that these systems allow against traditional traders.  
A 2013 research32 published by Bank of Italy, showed that the presence of 
High-Frequency traders can present the following benefits for the market: 
 Increase in liquidity available to market participants;  
 Reduction of the average bid-ask spread; 
 Reduction of transaction costs; 
 Increase in the price information efficiency; 
 increase in inter-market links; 
 
 Nonetheless, it remained undoubtedly true that High-Frequency Trading might have 
amplified the shock that arose from the tremendous sell order sent to the market, and played 
an important role in the Flash Crash, thus remaining a problem.  
Such negative effects needed mitigation, hence the authorities had begun discussing 
possible instruments to limit the HFT impact on the market. Among these was more 
                                                          
For more information concerning the Flash Crash, its origins and outcomes please read the official SEC – CFTC 
Report - “FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010”  
 
31  James Angel, Lawrence Harris and Chester S. Spatt in their research “Equity Trading in the 21st Century” 
(2010), had reached the conclusion that HFT can give the traders to avoid high transaction costs, so that “The 
ability to trade at low cost allows high-speed traders to provide great liquidity to the markets. Their willingness 
to devote capital to buy when others desire to sell and vice versa smooths out the price effects of order 
imbalances and further reduces transactions costs for end investors.”  
 
32 Bank of Italy Occasional Papers Nr. 198 “High Frequency Trading: una panoramica” by Puro Alfonso – 
September 2013  
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informative obligations for high frequency traders, insertion of circuit breakers33, or limiting 
the tick size34.   
The Directive has made attempts to subdue the possible collateral damage for the 
market’s integrity. Article 4 of the Regulation defines the Algorithmic Trading and High 
Frequency Trading as follows: 
 
 
MiFID II hence required companies undertaking such manner of trading to be 
registered as an investment firm, and receive authorization prior entering the market. Firm 
                                                          
33 MiFID II – Recital 64 
“Circuit breakers are market-based trading halts triggered by a potential price disruption and intended to 
avoid discontinuity in price movements. CBs can thus facilitate investor protection and help assure fairness in, 
and integrity of, markets. CBs can be split into two types: market wide and stock-specific, depending on whether 
trading is suspended across an entire trading venue, or for a single, or several single securities. Regulation 
and market practices on CBs differ significantly between the EU and US” -  ESMA Report on Trends, Risks 
and Vulnerabilities, 2015 
  
34 MiFID II – Recital 6 
By tick size is intended a price fluctuation, a minimum amount by which assets quoted price can move up or 
down.  
“‘algorithmic trading’ means trading in financial instruments where a computer 
algorithm automatically determines individual parameters of orders such as whether to 
initiate the order, the timing, price or quantity of the order or how to manage the order 
after its submission, with limited or no human intervention, and does not include any 
system that is only used for the purpose of routing orders to one or more trading venues 
or for the processing of orders involving no determination of any trading parameters or 
for the confirmation of orders or the post-trade processing of executed transactions; 
MiFIR –Article 4 (1) (39) 
 “‘high-frequency algorithmic trading technique’ means an algorithmic 
trading technique characterized by: a) infrastructure intended to minimize network 
and other types of latencies, including at least one of the following facilities for 
algorithmic order entry: co-location, proximity hosting or high-speed direct 
electronic access; b) system-determination of order initiation, generation, routing or 
execution without human intervention for individual trades or orders; and c) high 
message intraday rates which constitute orders, quotes or cancellations; ” 
MiFIR –Article 4 (1) (40) 
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conducting such activities are required to maintain a certain level of appropriateness to 
management of software, risk, and governance, and also comply with compulsory market-
rules. The company, disregarding the market conditions, is henceforth required to post firm 
quotes on regular and ongoing basis – they are basically required to act as market makers: 
which had caused lots of algorithmic traders’ anxiety. 
The first level of the Directive also defines the rules that the member-states are bound 
to abide, in order to provide a healthy and specifically:  
  
The trading venues will also be affected by the new regulation, being required to put 
up with stricter requirements. They are bound to provide the “co-location of the venue’s 
matching engine […] on a non-discriminatory, fair and transparent basis”35. .Such 
instruments as speed bumps will be put in place, whose roles would to slow down, artificially, 
trade order speed once it will have considered excessive, order-to-trade ratios36 - with the 
purpose of preventing frequent and fast order submission/cancel, Market participants that 
will place and subsequently cancel the order, repeatedly, will be subject to higher fees 
imposed by the trading venue. And last but not least, risk control systems – which will secure 
the resilience of trading venues.  
ESMA was burdened with regularly providing effective strategies to tame the out-of-
control algorithmic trading, by constantly consulting the fields experts. Its purpose will be to 
                                                          
35 MiFID II – Recital 62  
It is stated that the market participants’ facilities are always choosing to be positioned physically close to the to 
a trading venue’s matching engine, due to the fact that this proximity facilitates HFT.  
36  MiFID II – Recital 68 
 “‘Member States shall require a regulated market to have in place effective 
systems, procedures and arrangements to ensure its trading systems are resilient, 
have sufficient capacity to deal with peak order and message volumes, are able to 
ensure orderly trading under conditions of severe market stress, are fully tested to 
ensure such conditions are met and are subject to effective business continuity 
arrangements to ensure continuity of its services if there is any failure of its trading 
systems.” 
MiFID –Article 48 (1) 
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keep the pace with technological developments in financial markets and maintain market 
integrity37. 
 
6. Sanctioning regime 
The new directive and regulation have pressed matters also in the field of regulation’s 
breaches. It has focused more on strengthening and guaranteeing a more harmonized system 
of administrative sanctioning. “The use of criminal sanctions is framed so as to ensure the 
cooperation between authorities and the transparency of sanctions.” (European Commission 
Press Release, 2014) 
The sanctioning regime is defined under Article 51 MiFID 1 – which states:  
 
However, MiFID II places a more important focus upon the compliance policy, thus 
specifying that:  
 
                                                          
37 MiFID II – Recital 68 
 “‘[…] Member States shall ensure, in conformity with their national law, that 
the appropriate administrative measures can be taken or administrative sanctions be 
imposed against the persons responsible where the provisions adopted in the 
implementation of this Directive have not been complied with. Member States shall 
ensure that these measures are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.” 
MiFID –Article 51 (1) 
 “‘In order to ensure compliance by investment firms, market operators authorised to 
operate an MTF or OTF, regulated markets, APAs, CTPs or approved reporting 
mechanisms (ARMs), those who effectively control their business and the members of the 
investment firms and regulated markets’ management body with the obligations deriving 
from this Directive and from Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 and to ensure that they are 
subject to similar treatment across the Union, Member States should be required to provide 
for sanctions and measures which are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 
Administrative sanctions and measures set out by Member States should satisfy certain 
essential requirements in relation to addressees, criteria to be taken into account when 
applying a sanction or measure, publication, key powers to impose sanctions and levels of 
administrative fines.” 
MiFID –Recital 141 
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Furthermore, the new Directive denoted that the sanctions’ amount should be high 
enough to have a dissuasive effect upon the institutions and their managers – act a proof  that 
is might be more beneficial to abide the terms, rather than breaching them.38 The publishing 
of sanctions and authorities’ decisions regarding the previous infringements is believed to 
only strengthen the discouraging effect, thus is highly recommended.39   
 In order to enforce such compliance, the competent authorities shall have, under the 
national law, constant access to all the all the relevant information on the legal person’s 
activity40. Should any suspicions about market abuse arise, the authorities will be able to 
verify all the data (recordings of telephone conversations and data traffic records from 
executing firms, and telecommunications operators), and act should enough evidence be 
detected.  
 
7.  Investor protection  
The seventh and, as far, most important change within the new Directive had 
represented the Investor protection. The first directive had played an important role in the 
ensuring the proper level of protection for investors all across the EU, but some areas were 
still not covered, and others provisions were badly being implemented.  
The second directive has brought a wide number of changes to the investor protection 
regime. These changes are bound to influence and the full lifecycle of investment products.  
These changes can be narrowed down to:  
1. Increased transparency, allowing customers to have a better 
understanding where costs, fees, charges are concerned. 
2. Defining the advising service -  that is tailoring the strategy proposed to 
the client to clients’ needs.  
                                                          
38 MiFID II – Recital 142 
39 MiFID II – Recital 146 
40 MiFID II – Recital 143 
Page | 40  
 
3. Managing the revenue impact that the two previous changes would have 
on the inducements free offerings.  
4. Imposing stricter rules regarding product distribution and control.  
5. Redefined administrative responsibilities for investment companies. 
Investor protection represents a key element within both MiFID I and MiFID II. The 
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Chapter 3 Investor Protection. 
 
3.1 MiFID I provisions  
 
The European Union attaches great importance to investor protection and defending 
investor’s rights. In most European Member states, the investment legislation was well 
developed, but there was a need to consolidate and harmonize. The first Directive – MiFID 
has to be considered “a milestone for investor protection since it pursues the progressive 
approach by the EC of systemic protection, when compared to the approaches adopted in the 
previous three directives that pursued fair distribution of investment information to investors. 
Consequently, the MiFID in accordance with the best interests toward the integrated 
European securities without a centralized EU securities regulator.” (Lee, 2009) 
Many researchers had found that the provisions of MiFID I to enforce a safe investment 
environment and a high level of investors’ protection of have been at least questionable, if 
not inefficient. In his research John J. A. Burke, in 2009, after examining MiFID’s investor 
protection provisions and articles in the “larger context of the macroeconomic function of 
financial markets, and the theoretical underpinnings of investor protection in the United 
States and in Europe, as well as the practical track record of enforcement of investor 
protections in Europe to evaluate the effectiveness of investor protection under the new 
instruments.”  has reached the conclusion that “the style of investor protection envisaged 
within MFID is likely to impose substantial costs upon investors to the benefit of investment 
firms, while probably falling short of fulfilling the promises of the risk/reward equation. The 
effectiveness of investor protection, which depends exclusively upon the quality of 
enforcement, is questionable given the European Union’s passive enforcement style toward 
financial market misconduct” (Burke, 2009) 
Moreover, MiFID’s provisions had proved to be difficult enough that there was a 
reasonable risk that companies will not be able to withstand such pressure. Financial Services 
Authority in its press release had recognized that a difficult economic situation can shift 
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“investors interests” from investment company’s priorities, denoting that “There is a risk that 
due to the increased financial pressures on firms, they may not make the same endeavors to 
comply with conduct-of-business requirements, such as treating customers fairly and quality 
of advice. Where firms are faced with financial difficulties, there could be a tendency to 
concentrate on immediate problems.” (FSA, 2008 p. 25) 
One of the objectives of MiFID was to increase investor protection, to harmonize and 
adapt all operations across Europe to potential investors’ level of their knowledge and 
experience in the investment field. To do so, the Directive requires investment services 
providers to assess more thoroughly the suitability of services for their customers. 
The directive specifies all the necessary prerequisites for all the financial intermediaries, 
that the latter have to abide, and keeps all the information and answers to which could be 
made references whenever investment process questions might arise.  
Frankly speaking, MiFID sets three main principles that the professional participants of 
the securities market must comply with: 
- act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with client’s best interests. 
- provide clients with an appropriate and complete information that is specific, 
clear and indubitable.  
- provide investment services that take into account client’s specific situation. 
MiFID I’s has written the whole 2 defining the “Provisions to ensure investor 
protection”, where starting with Article 19 it defines the rules of conduct for the investment 
companies. The latter are bound to ensure that the companies act “honestly, fairly and 
professionally in accordance with the best interests of its clients” when providing financial 
services. Moreover all the information that the company would provide to the client must be 
“be fair, clear and not misleading.”41, containing details about the investment firm, such as:  
“— the investment firm and its services, 
                                                          
41 MiFID – Article 19 (2) 
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— financial instruments and proposed investment strategies; this should include 
appropriate guidance on and warnings of the risks associated with investments in those 
instruments or in respect of particular investment strategies, 
— execution venues, and — costs and associated charges”  
Being provided with this information the clients would be able to “understand the nature 
and risks of the investment service [or] financial instrument […] and consequently, to take 
investment decisions on an informed basis.”  
Article 19 defines also the rules that the companies would have to abide when advising 
their clients about the investment strategies the latter could pursue, stating that:  
 
Moreover, the Member States would have to make sure that such companies42 would 
taking into account client’s level of “knowledge and experience in the investment field 
relevant to the specific type of product or service offered or demanded so as to enable the 
investment firm to assess whether the investment service or product envisaged is appropriate 
for the client.”. Should the company consider the product at hand as unsuitable for the client 
– it would advise the client against it, or inform about the risks that the client might undertake 
by proceeding with the chosen strategy/product. In the case that the client refuses to provide 
the needed information for assessing it’s level of knowledge, the company should, thus, 
inform him that is unable to determine “whether the service or product envisaged is 
appropriate for him” and he might be subjected to a high level of risk.  
Nonetheless, should the company provide only such services as “execution and/or the 
reception and transmission of client orders”, they might be permitted to not ask the 
                                                          
42 All the companies except those specified in paragraph 4 of MiFID I.  
 “‘When providing investment advice or portfolio management the investment firm shall 
obtain the necessary information regarding the client's or potential client's knowledge and 
experience in the investment field relevant to the specific type of product or service, his 
financial situation and his investment objectives so as to enable the firm to recommend to the 
client or potential client the investment services and financial instruments that are suitable 
for him.” 
MiFID –Article 19 (4) 
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aforementioned information from the client, although this is true only under following 
conditions:  
- “shares [are] admitted to trading on a regulated market or in an equivalent third 
country market, money market instruments, bonds or other forms of securitized 
debt (excluding those bonds or securitized debt that embed a derivative), UCITS 
and other non‑complex financial instruments. A third country market shall be 
considered as equivalent to a regulated market if it complies with equivalent 
requirements to those established under Title III. The Commission shall publish 
a list of those markets that are to be considered as equivalent. This list shall be 
updated periodically, 
- the service is provided at the initiative of the client or potential client, 
- the client or potential client has been clearly informed that in the provision of 
this service the investment firm is not required to assess the suitability of the 
instrument or service provided or offered and that therefore he does not benefit 
from the corresponding protection of the relevant conduct of business rules; this 
warning may be provided in a standardized format, 
- the investment firm complies with its obligations under Article 18 43.”  
The investment company is bound, under Art. 19, to also provide the client with a report 
about the services provided to its clients, and the reports is advised to contain (where 
applicable) all the information containing “costs associated with the transactions and 
services undertaken on behalf of the client.” 
In the case that the client has issued the order through an intermediary, the investment 
company is advised to follow the instructions transmitted by the intermediary (which has to 
take responsibility for the accuracy of the order instructions), the company only being 
responsible for executing the order.44  
                                                          
43 Aricle 18 of MiFID I specifies all the provision related to the “Conflicts of interest” issue.  
44 MiFID – Article 20 (1) 
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Another issued ties close to the investor protection topic, is the best execution. The 
provisions related to best execution are described under the Article 21 that is “Obligation to 
execute orders on terms most favorable to the client”. It obliges the companies, under direct 
requirements from Member States to guarantee that the companies are following the best and 
most favorable strategy when executing client’s order. To ensure that the company must take 
into account the “price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution and settlement, size, nature or 
any other consideration relevant to the execution of the order.” (provided that it did not 
receive specific instructions related to such details directly from the client).45 
Following the execution, the company must provide all the info related to orders’ 
execution, retaining all the information about where, at what time, etc. thus presenting the 
client with the opportunity to “monitor the effectiveness of their order execution 
arrangements and execution policy in order to identify and, where appropriate, correct any 
deficiencies”.   
Article 22 denotes the rules that the investment company has to comply with when 
executing clients’ orders. Should the client’s order be not executable – the investment firms  
are, should they lack strict instructions from the client itself,  given the possibility to act of 
its own behalf, but always in client’s best interest46.   
 
Client Segmentation 
To protect investors, the directive obliges customers to be divided into categories when 
providing investment services. Investor will be the one to win from the adoption of MiFID, 
with all the investment companies being forced to compete with one another. Investors’ 
profitability has increased also, the competition has lowered the costs for the issuers and 
investors, also giving the investors a broader choice of products to invest in.  
                                                          
45 MiFID – Article 21 (1) – (2) 
46 MiFID – Article 22 (1) – (2) 
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According to the MiFID requirements, companies must classify customers according to 
three main categories: 
 professional client47 
 eligible counterparty48 and 
 retail clients49  
in order to assess their “compliance” with the suggested products, as defined by Rec. 31 
of MiFID: 
 
 The purpose of this division is to provide appropriate services based on just how big the 
customer’s experience in the securities market is, to choose the most appropriate type of 
service for the client, and to apply different levels of protection based on their segmentation. 
                                                          
47  “Professional client is a client who possesses the experience, knowledge and expertise to make its own 
investment decisions and properly assess the risks that it incurs. In order to be considered a professional client, 
the client must comply with the following criteria” MiFID – Annex II  
Annex II of MiFID specifies which of the clients should be specifically considered as professionals. As specified 
above, there’s a list of criteria that the latter must comply with to be considered as such, specifically they must 
be:  
“(a) Credit institutions (b) Investment firms (c) Other authorized or regulated financial institutions (d) 
Insurance companies  
(e) Collective investment schemes and management companies of such schemes (f) Pension funds and 
management companies of such funds (g) Commodity and commodity derivatives dealers (h) Locals (i) Other 
institutional investors” 
They also have to comply with two of the following requirements: “balance sheet total - EUR 20 000 000, net 
turnover - EUR 40 000 000, own funds -  EUR 2 000 000.” 
 
48 “Member States shall recognize as eligible counterparties […] investment firms, credit institutions, insurance 
companies, UCITS and their management companies, pension funds and their management companies, other 
financial institutions authorized or regulated under Community legislation or the national law of a Member 
State, undertakings exempted from the application of this Directive under Article 2(1)(k) and (l), national 
governments and their corresponding offices including public bodies that deal with public debt, central banks 
and supranational organizations.” MiFID – Article 24 (1) 
 
49 “Retail client -  means a client who is not a professional client;” MiFID II Article 4 (1) 11 
 “‘One of the objectives of this Directive is to protect investors. Measures to protect 
investors should be adapted to the particularities of each category of investors (retail, 
professional and counterparties)”  
MiFID – Recital 31 
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The highest level of protection for customers refers to the retail customers - this means 
that the client receives in this category a wide range of relevant information on investment 
products and services and, at the same time, will be advised of the potential risks associated 
with pursuing of investment strategies of his choice. Most will be classified as “normal 
customers”, which includes individuals. 
It is assumed that these customers are able to make their own investment decisions and 
correctly assess the potential risks, therefore they do not require such a high degree of 
protection, as opposed to retail customers. 
Clients can be transferred, in accordance with the terms of the legislation, into another 
category. Transfer from ordinary customers can mean the loss of the right to compensation 
on the part of the system of external guarantee (which is similar in purpose to the Reserve 
Fund of professional securities market participants) and the means to restrict or eliminate 
certain obligations to the Reserve Fund of professional securities market participants in 




Although much and more is said about customer categorization, customer profiling is 
not as covered in literature as it would be expected. MiFID maid it become an obligation. 
This client profiling reminds more of a “skilled – unskilled” division, but is a necessary 
step for protecting the persons who are not knowledgeable enough, don’t really possess the 
necessary skills to trade in financial instruments and are not able to fully understand and 
assess the risks related to their product of choice (consequently, there is a high probability 
their expectations will not be satisfied).  
Today’s the investment decisions, to large extent, influence life in the future - that is, 
from today's choice of a pension plan depends on the amount of maintenance in the future 
pension period.  Therefore, the client must carefully and independently analyze the risks 
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associated with investment activities and to take into account their possible impact and 
consequences. It should also take into account the properties of each particular security, 
services or other investment product, possible profitability, according to his level of risk 
tolerance and investment objectives. 
In particular, MiFID I requires investment firms to offer clients (investors), of certain 
financial products and services, to determine their investment profile on the basis of two tests: 
- Suitability test -The duty to do the suitability test arises whenever the firms has 
to provide investment services, or when to act as an investment advisor. I this 
way the investment firm shall obtain the necessary information on the 
knowledge, experience, client's financial position and investment objectives in 
order to be able to recommend those investment services and financial products 
that are suited to the client, its status, expectations and needs.  
The test for suitability is not necessarily only a requirement related to retail investors but 
also professional clients and eligible counterparties.  
However, for professional clients, the investment firms ̶ assuming that the later possess 
the required level of knowledge and experience ̶ assesses only their financial situation and 
investment objectives. 
- Appropriateness test – The test, compared to the suitability one, is carried out on 
all other cases of furnishing the investment services, (in particular, the 
performing orders received from brokers). They conduct this test in order to 
assess the appropriateness of a product or service for a particular client. 
Therefore, the company must request from the client information about his 
knowledge and experience.  
Just as in the case of the suitability test concerning “professional clients” investment 
firms are allowed not to dismiss additional checks that the clients possess the necessary 
knowledge and experience.  
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3.2    MiFID II provisions  
 
The Directive second edition (MiFID II) expands even more ways to protect the client, 
establishing additional powers for the states support of transparency in the markets and 
“fencing” off investors of knowingly unprofitable products.  FSA’s statement that “market 
participants and consumers may lose confidence in financial institutions and in the 
authorities’ ability to safeguard the financial system” (FSA, 2008. p. 28) remains the 
undoubted truth, thus state regulators seek to create an investment climate in which every 
investor, whether he invests millions of euro inheritance or a few thousand euros of pension 
accumulations, could feel protected from the market arbitrariness. 
Though MiFID I’s provisions were detailed enough, the crisis of 2008 has exposed the 
regime’s weaknesses. The Commission, in 2010 has issued a paper, related to the needed 
changes in the first Directive, and, the following year has followed up with specific proposals. 
The Commission has stated that the investors protection regime had needed to be updated in 
the face of complex financial instruments and perpetual innovation.  
 
The provision for harmonizing the Investor protection had been denoted in the Section 
2 of the Delegated act. Its opportune to mention that the Second Directive had the focus upon 
not changing the existent provision, but only strengthening them – presenting a series of 
changes in the most important areas concerning the Investors Safety, which can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
 
 “‘In recent years more investors have become active in the financial markets and are 
offered an even more complex wide-ranging set of services and instruments. In view of those 
developments the legal framework of the Union should encompass the full range of investor-
oriented activities. To that end, it is necessary to provide for the degree of harmonization 
needed to offer investors a high level of protection and to allow investment firms to provide 
services throughout the Union, being an internal market, on the basis of home country 
supervision”  
MiFID II – Recital 3 
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1. Inducements:  
Inducements50 were also stipulated within MiFID I, but MiFID II has brought significant 
changes to the topic. Under the new Directive the companies will be able to accept some 
inducements, but under some firm restrictions. Recital 74 delegates that: 
 
Following, the 75th Recital of MiFID II states that such benefits are allowed only in the 
case when the investment advice is provided on the in depended basis, the client is fully 
aware of any payments that hand been made of his behalf, and the amounts have been 
previously discussed with the client.  This type of inducements is also called as “third party 
payments”, and for retail clients they represent a research fee. Their purpose is to enhance 
the quality of the service provided to the client. ESMA’s opinion upon the issue that such 
minor, non-monetary benefits are safe to be disclosed to the public, although in a very generic 
way. Nonetheless, “MiFID II will introduce a complete ban on some firms receiving a 
payment or some other form of non-monetary benefit from third parties (such as payments 
that managers of investment funds make to investment the future, any portfolio manager or 
firm which says they provide [the investor] with independent financial advice will no longer 
be able to accept or retain payments (fees, commissions or any other monetary benefit) or 
                                                          
50 Inducements are referred to as “any monies, goods or services (other than the normal commissions and fees 
for the service) offered or received by an investment firm or any of its members of its relevant persons in relation 
to business for a client with or through another person, whether on a prepaid, continuous or retrospective 
basis” -  CESR’s Technical Advice on MiFID I implementation, 2005 
 
 “‘In order to strengthen the protection of investors and increase clarity to clients as to 
the service they receive, it is also appropriate to further restrict the possibility for firms 
providing the service of investment advice on an independent basis and the service of 
portfolio management to accept and retain fees, commissions or any monetary and non-
monetary benefits from third parties, and particularly from issuers or product providers. This 
implies that all fees, commissions and any monetary benefits paid or provided by a third party 
must be returned in full to the client as soon as possible after receipt of those payments by 
the firm and the firm should not be allowed to offset any third-party payments from the fees 
due by the client to the firm.”  
“Only minor non-monetary benefits should be allowed, provided that they are clearly 
disclosed to the client, that they are capable of enhancing the quality of the service provided 
and that they could not be judged to impair the ability of investment firms to act in the best 
interest of their clients.” 
MiFID II – Recital 74 
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non-monetary benefits that they receive from a third party for a service they carry out on 
[retail investor’s] behalf)” 51 
 Accept and retain fees 
and commissions 
from third parties? 
Accept and retain 
non-minor non-
monetary benefits? 









✕ ✕ ✓ 
Other investment 
firms 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
Table 3.1 Summary table of position on inducements under MiFID II 
Source: : Taylor Wessing Press Release, 2015 
 
2. New “Best Execution” Standards 
Acting under the Current regime (MiFID I) the firms are bound to take all the 
“reasonable steps to obtain, when executing orders, the best possible result”52. MiFID II 
though stipulates that “investment firms [will be required to] take all sufficient steps to obtain, 
when executing orders, the best possible result for their clients”53. ESMA defines that “the 
requirement for “sufficient” steps sets a higher bar for compliance than “reasonable” 
steps.”54 Firms will also be required to pay attention to series of factors when executing 
client’s order such as: “price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution and settlement, size, nature 
or any other consideration relevant to the execution of the order”. 
                                                          
51 “Enhanced protection for retail investors: MiFID II and MiFIR” ESMA, June 2014 
52 MiFID I – Article 21 (1) 
53 MiFID II – Article 27 (1) 
54 “Questions and Answers On MiFID II and MiFIR investor protection topics” – ESMA., 16th of December, 
2016 
Page | 52  
 
However small the wording change might be, the focus that ESMA has put upon this 
issue shows that the regulator will be expecting that the companies would change their 
policies, acting in a stricter way to ensure the reach of best execution.  
 ESMA has issued a technical standard, adding the fairness test when deciding the 
possibility of the best execution, taking into account the price, when trading on the OTC 
market, stipulating “MiFID II strengthens the existing best execution standard in relation to 
OTC products. In this regard, Article 64 of the MiFID II Delegated Regulation requires firms 
to check the fairness of the price proposed to the client when executing orders or taking 
decisions to deal in OTC products, including bespoke products, by gathering market data 
used in the estimation of the price of such products and, where possible, by comparing with 
similar or comparable products” (ESMA, 2016 p. 12), although stipulating that these 
requirement is not necessary to be followed for every single client order.  
 
3. Independent advice 
Investment service companies must inform their clients whether the advice is provided 
upon: 
1. Independent analysis, or 
2. Broad/restricted analysis of the market.  
Recital 73 stipulates:  
 
 “‘When advice is provided on an independent basis a sufficient range of different 
product providers’ products should be assessed prior to making a personal recommendation. 
It is not necessary for the advisor to assess investment products available on the market by all 
product providers or issuers, but the range of financial instruments should not be limited to 
financial instruments issued or provided by entities with close links with the investment firm 
or with other legal or economic relationships, such as a contractual relationship, that are so 
close as to put at risk the independent basis of the advice provided.” 
MiFID II – Recital 73 
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This stipulation is expected to provide a healthy investments environment, as well as 
ensure a presence of choice as for the clients, as well as for the companies.  
 
4. Enhanced information to clients 
MiFID II places a great focus upon the issue of giving the clients all the detailed 
information about investment products. For the companies advertising their services, bundled 
up with products – they must inform their clients whether these can be bought separately, 
and also provide all the details regarding the charges for all of the components.  
Article 24 denotes:  
 
Companies are required to provide all this information each year, during the “life” period 
of the investments. Companies should also inform their clients whether they will perform a 
suitability assessment of their products of choice.  
 
5. Suitability and appropriateness 
Probably one of the most important issues regarding investor protection being addressed 
by MiFID II. These provisions were also covered under the first Directive, though with some 
loopholes. The provisions, and their adequate functioning are to be strengthened by the 
 “‘Appropriate information shall be provided in good time to clients or potential clients 
with regard to the investment firm and its services, the financial instruments and proposed 
investment strategies, execution venues and all costs and related charges. […]: 
c) the information on all costs and associated charges must include information relating 
to both investment and ancillary services, including the cost of advice, where relevant, the 
cost of the financial instrument recommended or marketed to the client and how the client 
may pay for it, also encompassing any third-party payments. 
.” 
MiFID II – Article 24 1 (c) 
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second Directive. Article 25th of MiFID II “Assessment of suitability and appropriateness 
and reporting to client” addresses this issue, stating that:  
 
Investment companies are thus bound to assess the competences of their clients, when 
counseling the client regarding their strategies of choice. They are bound to “obtain the 
necessary information regarding the client’s or potential client’s knowledge and experience 
in the investment field relevant to the specific type of product or service, that person’s 
financial situation including his ability to bear losses, and his investment objectives including 
his risk tolerance”55 before providing their advice regarding the package of bundled products 
and services. The information to be obtained is denoted in the table below: 
 
 
The knowledge and 
experience of the 
client 
- the types of service, transaction and the regulated investments 
with which the client is familiar; 
- the nature, volume, frequency of the client’s transactions with 
regulated investments; and 
- the level of education, profession or relevant former profession 
of the client. 
The client’s financial 
situation 
- the source and extent of the client’s regular income; 
-  the client’s assets, including liquid assets, investments and real 
property; and 
-  the client’s regular financial commitments. 
- ability to bear losses 
                                                          
55 MiFID II – Article 25 (2) 
 “‘Member States shall require investment firms to ensure […] that natural 
persons giving investment advice or information about financial instruments, 
investment services or ancillary services to clients on behalf of the investment firm 
possess the necessary knowledge and competence to fulfil their obligations […]. 
Member States shall publish the criteria to be used for assessing such knowledge and 
competence.”  
                                                                                                MiFID II – Article 25 
(1) 





- the client’s investment horizon;  
- the client’s risk preferences, risk profile and risk tolerance; and 
- the purposes of the investment 
Table 3.2 Information to be obtained for the suitability test 
Source: : Nagelkerke, 2016 56 
 
The main focus here is put upon the level of client’s risk aversion and his ability to bear 
losses.  
Thus the suitability test must be done by the companies that provide investment advice 
(disregarding the fact that its independent or not)., and by the portfolio manager acting on 
the behalf of the client. The firm should obtain all the information prior to providing the 
advice. Should the investment company fail to provide the suitability opinion prior to the 
transaction itself, it still has the possibility to provide it in a written manner immediately after 
the conclusion of the transaction, but only under 2 conditions: “the client has consented to 
receiving the suitability statement without undue delay after the conclusion of the 
transaction; and (b) the investment firm has given the client the option of delaying the 
transaction in order to receive the statement on suitability in advance.”57 
Moreover, Article 25 bounds the investment companies to also provide written 
periodical communications (suitability reports) regarding: 
- the outline of the given investment advice; 
- the explanation of how the investment advice meets client’s risk aversion and 
financial strategy; 
For performing the appropriateness test the companies must assess their client’s 
experience within the investment field, and their knowledge. According to same Art. 25 point 
6, firms are obliged to perform the assessment of the financial instrument which the client is 
                                                          
56 “MiFID II Academy - Suitability and appropriateness” by Floortje Nagelkerke, Norton Rose Fulbright 
Article, 9th of February 2016 
57 MiFID II – Article 25 (6) a/b  
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set to buy, sell or hold. Should the package of choice be unsuitable58 for the client, the client 
must therefore warn the client of its inappropriateness and riskiness. These rules apply to all 
companies that execute client’s orders, send/receive orders or trade on their own account.  
The types of information the firms must obtain in order to perform the appropriateness 
test are specified in the table below: 
The nature of:  
 
- financial service,  
- transaction and  
- regulated financial instruments the client is familiar 
with 
The volume/frequency of:  - of the client’s transactions in regulated financial 
instruments; 
The level of:  - education,  
- profession or  
- former profession of the client 
Table 3.3: Information to be obtained for the appropriateness test 
Source: : Nagelkerke, 2016 59 
 
The appropriateness test might not be performed when the products are deemed to be 
“non-complex”60, the clients were, prior to providing the investment service, that the 
                                                          
58 Company’s opinion will be formed on the basis of the information provided by the client, and the 
suitability/appropriateness assessment performed by the investment firm’s manager.  
59 “MiFID II Academy - Suitability and appropriateness” by Floortje Nagelkerke, Norton Rose Fulbright 
Article, 9th of February 2016 
 
60 Non complex products are referred to the following instruments: 
“(i) shares admitted to trading on a regulated market or on an equivalent third-country market or on a MTF, 
where those are shares in companies, and excluding shares in non-UCITS collective investment undertakings 
and shares that embed a derivative; 
(ii) bonds or other forms of securitized debt admitted to trading on a regulated market or on an equivalent third 
country market or on a MTF, excluding those that embed a derivative or incorporate a structure which makes 
it difficult for the client to understand the risk involved; 
(iii) money-market instruments, excluding those that embed a derivative or incorporate a structure which makes 
it difficult for the client to understand the risk involved; 
(iv) shares or units in UCITS, excluding structured UCITS as referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 
36(1) of Regulation (EU) No 583/2010;  
(v) structured deposits, excluding those that incorporate a structure which makes it difficult for the client to 
understand the risk of return or the cost of exiting the product before term; 
(vi) other non-complex financial instruments for the purpose of this paragraph.” -  MiFID II – Article 25 (4) a 
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company does not perform the suitability assessment of the service/financial product offered, 
or in the case no “credit limits of loans, current accounts and overdraft facilities of clients 
61” were involved. In these cases, the client does not have the advantage of the suitability 
rules protection.  
ESMA was charged with providing the guidelines for the suitability and appropriateness 
assessment, not only the criteria of denoting the client’s level of knowledge and 
competence62, but also for all the financial instruments or deposits “incorporating a structure 
which makes it difficult for the client to understand the risk involve”63. On 7 December 2015 
ESMA publishes the “Final Report on MiFID II Guidelines on Assessment and Knowledge 
of Competence”, that will come into effect on 3 January 2017.64 
The difference between the two definitions (suitability and appropriateness) might seem 
subtle, but the two refer to different issues. Suitability is referred to the management and 
consulting field, meanwhile the appropriateness refers to the investing services. The 
distinction is the depth of clients’ analysis, because meanwhile the first is made only on the 
basis of the knowledge and experience, the second is made based on the portfolio, level or 
risk aversion etc.  
Amid the global financial crisis, the increased volatility in the financial markets when 
the fluctuation of prices of real assets reaches its extremes, a noticeable shift of markets 
toward disclosure and greater protection of the investors’ rights was noticeable. This is, in 
biggest part, due to the state regulators activity in developing the right management strategy 
to improve the relationships between the banks and their customers.  
MiFID Directive tackled risk tolerance assessment, presenting it as one of the main 
point. Under the specific requirement, the banks and other financial intermediaries were 
bound to assess their clients’ risk preferences prior to providing investment services or selling 
                                                          
  
61 MiFID II – Article 25 (4)  
62 MiFID II – Article 25 (9) 
63 MiFID II – Article 25 (10) a-b 
64 Source: ESMA’s press release, 17th of December 2015. Source: https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-
news/esma-news/esma-publishes-final-report-mifid-ii-guidelines-assessment-and-knowledge  
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investment products.  This regulation was set out explicitly for eliminating the information 
asymmetry present within the financial institutions vs. client rapport, allowing them to get to 
know their customers. The information asymmetry is an indisputable part of the bank-client 
rapport, as it becomes effectively impossible for all the future investors to have access to all 
the information, and be able to correctly process it for taking a prudent decision regarding its 
investment strategy. Because of the investor’s bounded rationality65, arises the necessity to 
recur to financial and investment advising. The bank’s manager will hence analyze the client 
from many perspectives in order to formulate an investment strategy best fitting client’s 
necessities, adequately tied to his risk tolerance and financial situation. 
The information needed for this assessment is required to be provided by the client, by 
way of compiling a standardized questionnaire with a certain types of questions.  
This is a mandatory step for clients as well as for the bank, and it is equally important 
for both, although more for the client, and should not be taken lightly. The client’s responses 
would serve to create a fitting strategy, and if they were to be not accurate, it would result 
into a non-appropriate strategy with unwanted consequences for the client’s portfolio. 
As stipulated before, MiFID I’s Article 19 defines the information needed for an 
appropriate assessment.   
 
                                                          
65 A theory developed by Herbert Simon, an American economist, according to which the people will choose 
not the most optimal decision in a situation, but a sufficiently acceptable one. According to the author people 
are not seeking to maximize their benefit, due to the fact that they are not able to assimilate and process all the 
necessary information to do so.  
 
„the investment firm shall obtain the necessary information regarding the client’s or 
potential client’s knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to the specific 
type of product or service, his financial situation and his investment objectives so as to enable 
the firm to recommend to the client or potential client the investment services and financial 
instruments that are suitable for him” 
MiFID I - Article 19  
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Although the Implementing Directive66 goes further providing explanations and defining 
terms, there is still a large loophole upon how to interpret the requirements. Especially 
difficult is to understand the tools used to calculate and define client’s risk profile. Although 
the directive is quite accurate and detailed where client’s experience and knowledge level is 
concerned, it lacks the description upon how to establish client’s risk aversion and other 
aspects of investors’ risk profiles. 
Implementing Directive Article 36 (1) defines the purpose of obtaining the information:  
 
The key requirement is that the client is truly familiar to the products he claim to be 
familiar. For instance, should the client claim to be no stranger to exotic derivatives, it will 
not necessary mean that the manager should suggest he invests in such. It is vital for the client 
to understand that it is in his best interest to disclose the truthful information regarding his 
knowledge and experience, and it is upon the adviser to explain such details. Furthermore, 
                                                          
66 The Implementing Directive defining the MiFID I (Directive 2004/39/EC) purposes more specifically, 
especially regarding the operating requirements and organizational conditions for investment firms.  
„Member States shall ensure that the information regarding a client’s or potential client’s 
knowledge and experience in the investment field includes the following, to the extent 
appropriate to the nature of the client, the nature and extent of the service to be provided 
and the type of product or transaction envisaged, including their complexity and the risks 
involved:  
a) the types of service, transaction and financial instrument with which the client is 
familiar; 
 b) the nature, volume, and frequency of the client's transactions in financial instruments 
and the period over which they have been carried out; 
 c) the level of education, and profession or relevant former profession of the client or 
potential client 
Implementing Directive - Article 36 (1) 
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this suitability assessment is vital for not only increasing customer trust in financial markets, 
but also providing stability to the financial statement.  
Upon using the assessment, the bank will deem the client as qualified. This status will 
be given judging on the client’s sufficient experience in transactions with securities in the 
stock market, his level of knowledge in the field of financial markets and also the available 
capital for investment. The meaning of the qualified term is that the such an investor needs 
less protection in the securities market, because it is believed that he is more aware of the 
occurring risks. Accordingly, it offers the bank the possibility to offer the client the riskier 
financial instruments, compared to a non-qualified client. In addition, it is common 
knowledge that assisting a qualified investor turns out cheaper for the bank. 
Commonly, all the required information about client’s qualification is gathered using a 
pre-determined questionnaire, whose purpose is to disclose client’s knowledge, familiarity 
with products, preferences, possible investment choices etc. The questionnaire functions as 
a “get to know your customer” instrument, eliminating the eventual ill advisement and 
misunderstanding.  
MiFID, although requiring the banks to analyze the clients, it gives only vague 
indications about how to do it. The banks are thus required to interpret the normative, and 
then transpose them into questionnaires, thus each financial service provider is in right to, 
personally, draft its questionnaire. The only request is that the questionnaire must be rigorous 
enough, to cover all the areas of the client’s needs, as to be able to profile it later.  
The main purpose on client’s profiling is to, subsequently, determine the suitability and 
appropriateness of a financial instrument for the client at hand. 
Marinelli and Mazzoli (2011) define the difference between the two concept 
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 Suitability Appropriateness 
Application field • Portfolio management 
• Investment advice 
Investment services other than 
portfolio management and 
investment advice. 
 
No test is required for execution 
only service. 
Set of information Three sections:  
• investment objectives; 
• financial capacity;  
• experience and 
knowledge. 
 
One section:  
Experience and knowledge. 
Type of financial 
intermediary 
 
Compulsory questionnaire:  
if the questionnaire is not 
filled up by the client, 
portfolio management and 
investment advice services 
cannot be provided. 
Non-compulsory 
questionnaire:  
if the client refuses to give 
some information, the service 
may be provided all the same, 
but under a disclosure 
obligation by the firm. 
Table 3.4  Suitability questionnaire and Appropriateness questionnaire: a comparison 




As a result, the questionnaires differ from one financial intermediary to other. A more 
in-depth analysis of the different questionnaires will be provided in Chapter 5.  
As a tool, the questionnaires seem to also have a range of limitations. The same person 
might be profiled differently after filling-in different questionnaires. In fact, it remains 
increasingly difficult to profile a person regarding the level of his risk aversion or risk seeking 
based on a range of descriptive questions. The results are quite subjective and, as of late, the 
                                                          
67 “Profiling investors with the MiFID: current practice and future prospects” by Camilla Mazzoli and 
Nicoletta Marinelli (2011)  
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true level of a client’s risk tolerance and its bad-matching with his risk profile assigned by 
the bank, has risen in the visor of the European regulators. Not only that ESMA published a 
series of guidelines regarding the correct examination and identification of the client’s level 
of risk tolerance, but also Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF), a French financial markets 
authority along with its British colleagues - the  Financial Services Authority (FSA) have 
issued studies and procedures regarding this issue.  
In fact, retrieving such information and building a good investment strategy becomes a 
struggle, which might result in erroneous conclusion and decisions. This is solely due to the 
fact that  client’s risk preferences are in fact influenced by a large number of factors, as will 
be explained more in-depth below.  
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Chapter 4 Client’s financial risk tolerance 
 
The term “risk” in the financial sector is used in a variety of contexts. In general, the risk 
represents the need to make a choice in contexts where is impossible to determine the results 
in advance. The result of such choices can be the either profit or loss, or the absence of 
change. The financial press often uses the term "risk tolerance" with regard to investor 
feelings. The last though may subsequently change being affected by some particular events. 
However, modern economic theory of the investment portfolios and strict requirements for 
the optimal investments allocation are based on expected utility analysis and the concept of 
risk aversion (reverse risk tolerance). The economic literature and the literature devoted to 
personal finance management traditionally pays a lot of attention to the concept of "risk 
aversion".  
For people working in the conditions of modern economy, risk aversion is the key when 
choosing among a variety of financial strategies. Stigler and Becker (1977, p. 76) noted that 
people’s preferences (tastes) "... do not change in a whim, and, moreover, do not have strong 
individual differences”68. The researchers believe it is possible that individual preferences 
are due to genetic differences between individuals or the characteristics of their early 
socialization. The data suggested that on level of investors risk tolerance have influenced 
their past achievements and failures, financial and life goals, the ability to handle stress, the 
degree of self-confidence, the desire to control their life situation, and even some of the 
features of its genetics and neurophysiology. Lindamood and Hanna relate that there are at 
least four methods of retrieving information about client’s risk tolerance, that is: asking 
directly about client’s investments decision, the combination of his investment, asking 
subjective questions all the while assessing his actual behavior, or asking to make a decisions 
                                                          
68 According to the two scholars, people’s preferences, once formed, will usually remain unchanged, being 
subject to change only under a heavy advertising. Often producer of goods would actually manage to persuade 
the customer to prefer his products to those of his competitors. Heavy advertising is different from simple 
advertising, the difference consisting its purpose. While simple informative advertising focuses on just 
informing potential customers of a new product, heavy persuasive advertising’s purpose is of forcefully 
persuading them to buy new product. 
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on the basis of hypothetical scenarios (2004, p. 29). Of course, we must not disregard the 
objective market characteristics – the processes creating uncertainty on the market, which 
may give rise to potential risks for the participants. For instance, the volatility of invertors’ 
income, the correlation between the incomes earned by an investor and equity returns etc. 
The complex issue of risk tolerance has led to a distinction between risk attitudes 
(preferences) of an individual and his ability to bear the risk – that is risk capacity. Assuming 
that true risk tolerance does not change from one demographic group to another, the key to 
developing a working investment strategy for the client must be based on the risk analysis of 
the current economic situation. The degree of influence of risk tolerance on the best 
investment choice depends on the person’s ability to take risks. For example, young investors 
who choose to invest in pension funds are expected to have relatively high level of risk 
tolerance (the ability to take risks), taking into account the long time that they until 
retirement. For them it makes no sense (even for those of them who have a low level risk 
tolerance) to choose conservative portfolios. For people approaching the retirement age, or 
people who already retired, the problem of tolerance and building an optimal portfolio of 
investments is much more complex. In such cases, a conservative distribution of personal 
investments would be much more appropriate.  
A few years ago, there was a very significant amount of researches on the problems 
related to the risk tolerance of various population groups. The emphasis in such researches 
was often put, though, on the investment behavior of qualified investors. Until lately there 
was little research which covered the issues related to relationship between individual‘s 
financial literacy the and his attitude to financial risk. There is a significant lack of techniques 
for the measurement individual’s risk perception and risk tolerance. Kogan and Wallach - 
built one of the first techniques in 1960s - The Kogan Wallach Risky Shift Questionnaire. It 
was the first instrument to propose rudimentary forms of individual’ risk attitude. Following 
them, in the ‘90s USA have developed an evaluation system related to the risk within the The 
Survey of Consumer Finances project conducted by the National Opinion Research Center. 
However, all of these measuring instruments have their limitations.  
Page | 65  
 
In particular, critics point out the fact that the questions asked in the Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF) project framework actually assesses the degree of familiarity of most 
respondents with financial terms, not their risk tolerance. Another version of risk attitude 
assessment, proposed as part of the Health and Retirement Study, requires respondents to 
understand risk as a sort of gambling. In particular, as the researchers note, the basic 
components of the process recognized as client’s risk profiling represents, in fact, a method 
of assessing risk tolerance, linking it with the characteristics of the investment portfolio.  
 
4.1  Financial literacy’s vs Age and Education: Effects on risk tolerance 
 
Without basic knowledge, skills and a corresponding level of financial literacy is 
impossible to have a correct governance and use of the variety of financial products and 
services. Financially educated citizens are more active in the financial markets, have a 
smaller amount of overdue debts to the bank and tend to be more careful when planning their 
retirement. Financial markets around the world are becoming more and more available for 
private investors, just as the new financial instruments and products are becoming more 
common. With so many choices and opportunities for a person, not competent in such 
matters, is difficult to understand what he needs to pay attention to when using financial 
instruments, and to determine what options are the best choice personally for him. 
Before starting to invest, the investor must determine his personal investment strategy. 
The strategy will be based exclusively particular investor’s features, regarding the risk 
tolerance level, level of financial knowledge, time which the investor is willing to dedicate 
to the investment management process and many else. A vital role in the choice of strategy 
plays the level of financial literacy. Citizens are aware, to a greater extent, of the typical 
investment instruments such as bank deposits, and to a lesser extent of such instruments as 
bonds, stock and other securities. 
The use of financial instruments involves certain risks. Investment strategies of different 
types of investors will vary according to his risk appetite: 
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 Aggressive investors tend to invest in short-term investments products, which in 
fact are riskier.  
 Moderate investor decides to invest only after a detailed analysis of the market. 
He prefers  to diversify his portfolio, reducing the risk level, making use of 
medium-term operations; 
 Conservative investor attaches great importance to reliability. He’s moto will be 
“better safe than sorry” thus being satisfied with a lower yield, provided that  is 
not risking too much. The main purpose of his investment strategy - to preserve 
what he has. 
 
Scholars perceive the Financial literacy is as the ability of an individual to understand 
the terminology of the financial market, to calculate the profitability of financial investments, 
to understand the value of money and predict the likelihood that a negative event occurs. 
Financially educated individual also distinguishes the types and quality of financial 
instruments, understands the difference between bonds and shares, can assess the impact of 
interest rates on the financial asset value.  
The data shows that many times the choice of an investment strategy is tied to the 
knowledge a person has about the market. Many scholars have demonstrated there was 
indeed a strong correlation between the level of financial literacy and risk tolerance. Taking 
into account the publications of Swedish scholars such as Engelberg and Sjöberg, which in 
2009, using the data about Swedish students that pursued courses of studies in Economics 
and a group of general population not specialized in finance, showed the financially literate 
people perceived the financial risk in a more positive light, rather the non-literate people 
(non-students). They formulated the following hypothesis “…students of finance will show a 
more pronounced preference than non-students for economic risk-taking, more gambling and 
speculation, more sensation seeking, and higher emotional intelligence.” (Engelberg, 
Sjöberg, 2009, p.38). This comes in line with the hypothesis formulated by Rui Yao who 
stated, three years later, that a person who lacks the financial experience and knowledge, 
needed to be an active market participant, would struggle to identify correctly the level of 
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risk attached to a certain operation.  This will result in a much more risk averse behavior, 
compared to the person that will not lack the knowledge. However, this is not a dogma – 
people might still deviate from their usual behavior, “it is reasonable to anticipate that people 
will deviate from their general pattern of risk taking from time to time.” (Grable &  Rabbani, 
2014. p. 180) 
Other studies also tie the level of financial literacy to a person’s age. It is denoted that 
people over 50-60 years will be inclined to be more financially literate compared to other 
people. Thus the people who have near the retirement age, thus there is a self-education 
incentive, idea also sustained by A. Lussardi and O. Mitchell (2007) denoting that the 
empirical results of her work based on the average American citizens a show a positive 
relation between the financial literacy and planning of their income after retirement. 
“Literacy can also be enhanced by the people who have enough resources and utilize these 
resources to obtain financial information for implying better outcomes from investment 
decisions.” (Awais, 2016). Lussardi and Mitchell states that the studies concluded on younger 
people, up until 2007, do not present significant results. It is due to the fact that is hard to  
show evidence of a young person investment approach, whether is aggressive or 
conservative, as not every one of them has a long-term investment strategy put in place for 
the retirement. Lussardi speculates the strategy might be formulated, as the person will near 
the retirement age. As of then, the studies more easy to conduct based on the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS), the average age of respondents being 50. Instead, the two scholars 
decided to conduct the study based on Rand American Life Panel (ALP) – a survey for a 
group of 812 respondent among which were also people younger than 50 years, and because 
it had a more accurate approach, with more detailed questions. The analysis was based on a 
set of eight by sophisticated literacy questions regarding different investment topics:   
Questions:  
1. Main function of the stock market 
2. Knowledge of mutual fund. 
3. Relation between interest rate and bond prices 
4. What is safer: company stock vs stock mutual fund 
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5. Which is riskier: stocks vs bonds 
6. Highest return over long period: savings accounts, bonds or stocks 
7. Highest fluctuations: savings accounts, bonds, stocks 
8. Risk diversification 
 

































































































Table 4. 1  Percent Correct by Sophisticated Literacy Question and Age 
Source: Lusardi, A., Mitchell, O.S (2007) 
 
As can be seen, such characteristics as age of the investor are strongly correlated with 
the financial literacy. On average people that are over the age of 50 present a higher level of 
knowledge. The group of over 50 responded on average 12% more correct compared to the 
group of under 50 years old. The author implies that this is due to the fact that the people 
were required to gather information, invest, build a healthy investment strategy, diversify his 
risk, being responsible for maintaining their personal wealth.  
 





















































































































Table 4. 2  Percent Correct by Sophisticated Literacy Question and by presence of College Education 
Source: Lusardi, A., Mitchell, O.S (2007) 
 
The study also reveals that the presence of college education is a factor influencing the 
people’s financial literacy. People with a degree understand better the sophisticated financial 
and risk terms, thus are able to build themselves a healthy investment strategy. Although the 
author states that a knowing person not necessarily implies people who undertook an 
economic university career, but also those people who “were exposed to economics in school 
and to company-based financial education programs.” (Lusardi, A., Mitchell, O.S, 2007) 
Remains undoubtedly true that the fact of better understanding the financial terms will 
result in a much profitable investment strategy, and a more aggressive one. Lussardi and 
Mitchell quote previous studies of such scholars as Kimball and Shumway (2006) Christelis, 
Jappelli and Padula (2006) and Hilgert and Hogarth (2003), each of these studies denoting 
that “financially unsophisticated households tend to avoid the stock market”, being afraid to 
lose their wealth investing in products characteristics of which do not understand. In fact, if 
they decide to start investing – they would most probably choose a very conservative strategy, 
their objective being only to preserve the amount they have, not risking too much.  
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4.2  Risk perception and Individual’s Expected Utility 
 
The Decision Theory – is a research are involving concepts related to logic, mathematics, 
statistics, economics, management and psychology in order to study how people find most 
advantageous possible solution to a specific problem. According to it, people will try to make 
the best decision regarding the issue, as to be able to get possible outcome. This is the core 
of the Expected Utility Theory (EUT).  
Very briefly, the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) requires „decision maker (DM) to 
choose between risky or uncertain prospects by comparing their expected utility values, 
making the choice in favor of most profitable for him.” (Mongin, 1997) 
Since utility is a subjective concept for each investor, depending on personal 
interpretations, it is quite difficult, if not impossible to be compared between different ones. 
However, using the utility function allows characterizing the particular investor actions, and 
therefore better understanding the general vector of the decision-making. To analyze the 
investor’s behavior based on its utility function, it is necessary to determine the shape of the 
latter. It is reasonable to assume that the investor will always prefer more of his wealth rather 
than less, as a higher wealth level provides additional possibilities, thus with the growth of 
wealth increases the total amount of utility. However, for different investors wealth unit may 
have a different utility. 
According to the risk aversion level the investor’s utility function changes. On its basis, 
investors’ are then categorized into same three different types: risk averse, risk seeking and 
risk neutral.  
The first type of investors, risk averse - are those who are not prone to risk. His shape if 
his utility function is concave with U representing the utility level, and w representing the 
level of wealth.  
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                                                        𝑈(𝑤) = √𝑤                                                         (1.1) 
 
Figure 4. 1 Utility function of a risk-averse investor 
 
This type of investors, choosing between the two assets with the same expected return 
but different risks, he will choose the less risky asset. Thus the more he risks, the lower the 
utility personally for him: 
The second – the risk seeking type of investors is represented by a convex form of utility 
function.  
                                                              𝑈(𝑤) = 𝑤
2                                                   (1.2)  
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Figure 4. 2 Utility function of a risk-seeking investor 
 
The graph shows that the marginal utility of a risk-seeking investor increases with the 
growth of his wealth. As a result, among the assets with the same expected return but different 
risks, the investor will prefer riskier assets. 
The third type of investors – risk neutral ones – are characterized by a linear function, 
as can be seen from the figure below.  
                                                              𝑈(𝑤) = 𝑤                                                    (1.3) 
 
Figure 4. 3 Utility function of a risk-neutral investor 
 
For him the increase in wealth will bring the same change in marginal utility.  
The Expected Utility Theory (EUT) was the basic theory to explain the process of 
decision making for investors, but it is not flawless. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky' 
back in the ‘70s have criticized the EU theory, pointing out its limitations. According to the 
author, people fail to make optimal decisions and perceive the level of risk accordingly, due 
to a series of factors. People’s risk perception might be influenced by:  
 Life period - youth, maturity, old age. At each stage, the perception of risk and 
response to it changes. 
Page | 73  
 
 Age: Young people tend to be reckless; meanwhile old people are very cautious. 
 Gender: Women tend to be more prudent, than most men. 
 Level of wealth: poor people are more daring and willing to take more risk. The 
rich ones, though, are more inclined to preserve rather than take a great risk to 
gain more.  
 Nationality: in the mid 70s for a few years a research about the differences 
between the leaders of different countries was conducted. It was found that the 
sensitivity of the risk (risk tolerance) leaders from Belgium, Germany and 
Austria is much lower than the Japanese and Dutch. At the same time, US 
managers had the highest sensitivity to risk. This result can be interpreted in 
different ways, but there is no doubt that this difference is significant.  
 Types of risk and level of self-esteem: Gambling for charity and losing big 
amounts of money might consider by some it a noble cause, by others – a waste. 
 Cognitive errors – “Individuals use heuristics, or rules of thumb, because they 
have limited attention, memory, education, and processing capabilities.” (Bikker  
and de Dreu, 2012, p. 2146) 
 
The new Prospect Theory – the alternative developed by the two scholars, advocates a 
new point of view of decision-making process, which denies the fundamental postulate of 
the rationality of market participant’s. Kahneman’s research conducted a 70ies of the 
twentieth century showed that people are not always guided by their own benefit 
considerations being under the influence of various character traits. 
Also, during the financial crisis time, or in times of a financial turmoil, obtaining reliable 
data is costly, not only in matters of time but also leads to a decrease of investors trust in the 
received information, and the rise of information asymmetry69 issue. The consequence of 
                                                          
69  “The asymmetric information results in adverse selection problem which is the phenomenon where there is 
a hidden characteristic problem and people on the informed side of the market self-select in a way that is 
harmful to the uninformed side of the market” - Tumay M. (2009) 
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such issue would be a reduction in people’s efficiency to process the information. As a result, 
people’s decisions will be subject to subjective factors, such as stereotypes, other’s opinion, 
information received from the media etc. As such their economic decisions will more 
influenced by psychological characteristics, rather than the need to define the objective 
characteristics of the portfolio, such as the level of risk, the rate of return, resulting in 
decisions that are not optimal in accordance with the expected utility theory.  
As so, making the process of making the optimal decision will be disrupted by the factor 
of people’s behavior. It should be recalled that the process of making any decisions under 
uncertainty is based on people’s perceiving of two interrelated aspects: objective factors - 
changes in the external environment, and the subjective factor - how people understand these 
changes.  
Both the objective and subjective factors are vital for forming a good understanding of 
the issue and the optimal choice to make. The objective factors form the investor’s 
experience, but is the subjective factors that will, at the end of the day, dominate the process.   
 
4.3 Assessing investor’s risk tolerance through questionnaires 
 
Another method, which is the main tool to assess the risk tolerance in the asset 
management industry, are questionnaires. A typical questionnaire is not less than 10 and not 
more than 25 questions. It may be a subjective assessment of the motives of one’s behavior 
associated with the risk. Can detect certain associations or try to make a  subjective 
assessment of past events. Respondents can be asked to qualitatively or quantitatively 
describe a situation from the past, or present their most probable behavior in a hypothetical 
situation. They are as well subject to questions regarding their employment, their level of 
income as well to questions related to their family. 
When drawing up the questionnaire, it is necessary to implement the knowledge of 
human behavior and their relationship to risk. It can be helpful to avoid serious mistakes. For 
Page | 75  
 
instance, Nigel Nicholson’s research in 2002, showed a surprisingly insignificant relationship 
between the risk tolerance and various human activities. The survey across 1600 respondents 
showed that the correlation between risk tolerance in investments, and risk taking in the sport 
field was equal to only 0.196.  For instance, a situation where a reckless skydiver invests only 
in the most reliable government bonds, should not be surprising, “individuals are not 
universally risk tolerant (or risk averse) in all areas of their life” (Grable &  Rabbani, 2014. 
p. 174)  
Another error that might arise in the using of questionnaires is because of the 
peculiarities of probability perception, such as systematic re-evaluation of small 
probabilities. Finally, investors could be not enough financially informed to understand 
specific concepts such as “volatility” or “Standard Deviation”. They might be embarrassed 
to admit it, hence, misinterpret the question. Obviously, the results of the analysis would be 
quite inaccurate, being on misinterpreted questions.  
Considering a few examples of questionnaires actively used for assessing the risk 
tolerance in the Western countries. The questionnaire of Vanguard70 company (Annex 1) 
consists of 11 questions. Three of them are associated with the investment horizon and 
identify the approximate time before having to spend the money invested, the period for 
which these funds will be spent. Another four questions identify investor's attitude toward 
asset volatility and expected behavior in case of a distress on stock or bond market. Other 
questions are related to the investor’s trust in other’s opinion, the confidence he puts in a 
unqualified person’s advice related to the investments he should make in the future. The 
remaining question are related to how stable are his current and future revenues; how 
experienced he is in the financial markets. Last question required to choosing between 
alternatives - three hypothetical scenarios for a one-year investment.   
On the basis of the responses, it immediately calculated the recommended asset 
allocation for short-term reserves, bonds and stocks. The investor is not informed about his 
                                                          
70 “One of the world's largest and most respected investment companies” with “About 280 low-cost traditional 
funds and ETFs and also 16 locations worldwide with more than 14,000 crew members” – source: 
https://vanguard.com  
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presumed level of risk-tolerance at the end of the day, he only receives a recommended 
proportion of stocks and bonds he might take into account when building his future portfolio. 
The questionnaire is available online, and every soon-to-become investor can fill it in and 
receive a recommended investment strategy in about 2 minutes.  
The result of filling in the questionnaire in quite a conservative way, also being not quite 
skilled in financial matters, and having a current allocation of 100% short-term reserves – 
the algorithm had suggested (taking into account the responses) to invest future savings as 
follows:  
 
Figure 4. 4  Suggested investment strategy after the compilation of investor questionnaire 
Source: vanguard.com 
 
Undoubtedly, the process of filling the questionnaire and, in general, the triviality of the 
recommendations leave no doubt about how seriously should the investor take the advised 
strategy. 
In fact, the low credibility of questionnaire of such companies as Fidelity, Vanguard, A. 
G. Edwards s have been demonstrated by Ken Yook71 and Robert Everett72. In 2003, they 
published a research showing that the mean value of the correlation between risk tolerance 
estimate of the same people 6 in every one of the companies is equal to 0.56. This leads to 
the conclusion that each of the companies measure their “version” of risk tolerance, not the 
unique psychological characteristics of the person. 
                                                          
71 Associated professor at Johns Hopkins Carey Business School 
 
72 Professor of Finance, Lock Haven University of Pennsylvania, Dept. of Business Administration 
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Quite different looks the questionnaire FinaMetrica, and Australian company which 
specializes in a scientifically based risk tolerance assessment. Their questionnaire consists of 
25 questions (please see Annex 2), including a variety of questions also related to the 
individual perception and emotions. Filling it in is often necessary to express the attitude to 
the problem of risk attitude, formulated in a rather unexpected way. For example, it is 
proposed to reflect on feelings that emerge after making significant financial decisions. The 
answers are assigned specific numerical values, then added to give specific weights – 
resulting in the value of risk tolerance, a number from 0 to 100. FinaMetrica’s questionnaire 
is calibrated for more than 20 thousand people. Companies ae using the FinaMetrica 
questionnaires around the globe since 1998 until present days.  
Taking a look at such big banking groups as UniCredit S.p.a and Intesa Sanpaolo 
questionnaires for a natural person (Annex 3 and 4) we reveal the same image. Meawhile the  
Intesa Sanpaolo questionnaires is quite complex addressing many issues, Unicredit’s one 
seems quite short and does not cover all the MiFID  requirements,  
For all the questionnaire’s shortcomings used by the financial industry to assess risk 
tolerance, there’s an undeniable value of them as an educational tool for the potential 
investor. The is especially true for the questionnaire FinaMetrica, filling in which, a person 
begins to much better understand the meaning of the risk. He has an opportunity to compare 
his life goals and financial capabilities, calibrate own ideas about the investment 
characteristics of various asset classes in line with real market data on their volatility and 
return, and even to understand what aspects of the investment process cause him the greatest 
discomfort. To improve the educational function of the questionnaires assessing risk 
tolerance, it is best to use graphical tools, such as the visualization of the distribution of 
returns. In this case, the visual picture allows the investor intuitive enough to compare 
different levels of profitability, estimating the probability of realization of these values. 
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Chapter 5 MiFID Questionnaires 
 
The end of year 2015 had been marred by the issue arising around 4 small Italian banks, 
such as: Banca Etruria, Banca Marche, Cassa Ferrara e CariChieti. The mentioned banks had 
to be rescued, with the involvement of shareholders and stakeholders, including the holders 
of riskier bonds. The apex of this situation was represented by high distress to the 
stakeholders, and the subsequent exchange of accusations between Italian and European 
institutions on how to save the banks in question. The European Commission stated, after the 
analysis of the situation, that the four banks had been selling financial products that were 
inappropriate for their clients’ risk profile. The banks were found guilty of selling risky 
products even to those clients deemed to be little prone to risk. 
A share of the fault lies on the clients as well, who often did not even know what they 
had in the portfolio. They invested superficially, without knowing well the risks they faced. 
The situation showed that there is huge information asymmetry between the parties, and this 
issue had to been treated. 
The fact that, maybe even filling in the questionnaire the investment company was 
requesting, the client may have not understood the questions, hence the profile of risk for the 
client was wrong, even if judged effectively by the bank manager gave rise to the problem of 
evasive responsibility. Should the client’s risk profile reveal to be not accurate, or all the way 
incorrect – the intermediary will not be blamed for ineffectively judging the client. This might 
be due to the building of an quite difficult questionnaire, containing nonspecific questions 
that might confuse the client. With its implementation, the second directive is implying that 
there are to be made changes to the questionnaires, their structure and questions in order to 
better asses the risk tolerance level of the client prior to offering any investment advice.  
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5.1   Descriptive and content analysis 
 
The fact that MiFID gives only a quite suggestions, as seen in previous chapter, not 
denoting specifically how the clients should be assessed and what questions are to be put into 
the questionnaire. It does not also provide the questionnaire itself as an example. Thus, the 
banks are to build their own questionnaire, having the norms of MiFID as a guide. This may 
result in a quite subjective assessment. This is because the banks have their own algorithms, 
thus the risk profiling of the clients does not coincide across Italian investment companies. 
Some of the questionnaires were found to be longer, more analytical when the questionnaires 
of the other investment companies were quite short and concise.  
Nicoletta Marinelli and Camilla Mazzoli in their research paper have analyzed 14 
questionnaires of 14 investment companies73 that cover 90% of the market. Their findings 
relate the fact that there is quite a discrepancy74 in terms of number of question, their type, 
and regarding the coverage of MiFID requirements. As such, they find that the range of 
questions in the questionnaire varies from 9 to 37, the most companies being focused upon a 
media of 19 questions. 
 
Figure 5. 1  Nr. of questions in the sample’s questionnaires  
Source: Marinelli and Mazzoli (2011) 
                                                          
73 The authors did not reveal the names of the companies of their sample analysis.  
74 “Profiling investors with the MiFID: current practice and future prospects” by   Marinelli N. and Mazzoli C. 
(2011) 
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As of the fact of coverage of the MiFID requested areas, each financial intermediaries 
(from the sample of 14 investment companies) their findings show that only one company 
has implemented a full coverage with its questionnaire.  
After the analisys of MiFID requests, the authors denoted there are at least 13 questions 
needed to be asked from an investor, all of them broken down into 3 main sections, as 
follows:  
Section Should include 
Investment objectives • Information on the length of time for which the client 
wishes to hold the investment 
• The investor’s preferences regarding risk taking  
• His/her risk profile75 
• The purpose of the investment 
Financial capacity • Source and extent of his or her regular income  
• His or her assets (including liquid assets)  
• Investment and real property  
• His or her regular financial commitments 
Experience and 
knowledge 
• Types of service, transaction and financial instrument with 
which the client is familiar 
• The nature, volume and frequency of the client’s 
transactions in financial instruments 
• The period over which the client’s transactions have been 
carried out  
                                                          
75  “we associated the ‘preferences regarding risk taking’ item with all the questions related to the risk and 
return characteristics of the investments the client is willing to undergo (objective risk), while we interpreted 
the ‘risk profile’ item as the one aimed to know the behavior of the client in situations of riskiness and 
uncertainty (subjective risk)” Marinelli and Mazzoli (2010) regarding the “risk profile” clause in the suggested 
items.  
 
Page | 82  
 
• The level of education of the client  
• Profession or relevant former profession of the client. 
Table 5. 1  Set of suggested items for a questionnare  
Source: Marinelli and Mazzoli (2011) 
 
 
The results were quite far from perfect.  
 
Figure 5.2 Completeness of the suitability questionnaires of the Italian investment intermediaries 
Source: Marinelli and Mazzoli (2011) 
 
According to the data, only one of the 14 companies did indeed cover all the areas and 
items relevant for building a correct risk profile, according to the MiFID requirements. As of 
the entire of sample, each of the companies in their suitability questionnaires covered 7 
questions out of 13.  
“less investigated areas are those regarding: regular financial commitments (seven 
questionnaires), the asset composition (six questionnaires), the risk profile (four 
questionnaires), the period over which past investments have been carried out (one 
Page | 83  
 
questionnaire). Some intermediaries provide ‘extra’ questions, not included in the 
‘benchmark’ scheme suggested by MiFID.” (Marinelli and Mazzoli (2011) 
This will undoubtedly result in inaccurate results, inaccurate profiling and overall in an 
inaccurate investments strategy for the clients. As the data shows, having such a poor 
coverage of the MiFID requirements it is expected that a person will be profiled differently 
in each of the companies from the sample. 
In France, the same questionnaires analysis was performed by André de Palma and 
Nathalie Picard for the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF). Their purpose of study was 
to reveal a “diagnosis and an objective and quantitative measurement of the reliability of the 
main tools that financial institutions have designed to evaluate risk profiles.” (De Palma and 
Picard, 2010) 
 based on the sample 14 questionnaires of the 12 companies reported as follows:  
• Association des Petits Actionnaires Indépendants (APAI)  
•  BNP Paribas  
• BPCE  
• CGPLand  
• Chambre des Indépendants du Patrimoine  
• CM5‐CIC  
• Cortal Consors  
• Crédit Agricole SA  
• HSBC  
• Lazard  
• Rothschild  
• Société Générale 
 
According to the two scholars, out of the 14 questionnaires analyzed – there was a 
compliance with the following. 
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Figure 5.3 Completeness of the suitability of the French investment intermediaries questionnaires 
Source: Self elaborated based on results of De Palma & Picard, 2010 
 
As reported, all the questionnaires had a part of the question concerning the 
experience/knowledge the clients possessed in the investment field. Nonetheless, “the 
questions deal more with experience than with knowledge, and they rarely address the two 
complementary facets of experience, namely objective and subjective experience.” (De Palma 
& Picard, 2010) 
For the Principal Component Analysis, each of the questionnaires have been assigned a 
letter, then analyzed related to two main dimensions:  
1. Focus on client’s financial situation, purpose of the investment as well as client’s 
risk appetite. (horizontal) 
2. Focus on client’s experience, financial literacy, and knowledge related to the 
investment activity (vertical) 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Personal characteristics
Investment amount
Attepmts to quantify risk taking preferences
Client’s financial situation
Risk‐taking preferences
Investment goals and holding period
Client’s knowledge and experience
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Figure 5.4 Principal Component Analysis of the French investment intermediaries’ questionnaires 
Source: De Palma & Picard, 2010 
 
The results of the analysis has reported three main clusters. These three groups of are 
formed by the questionnaires that are particularly comparable among them.  
- As follows, four of them (B, D, H, J) focus strongly on the client’s financial 
situation and characteristics, not quite putting the emphasis on the personal 
characteristics of the investor.  
- The other five (E, N, O, F, M) form a group, positioned in the center, which 
denotes the fact that they are fairly focus on all the client’s characteristics, as well 
as financial situation. They represent the “golden middle”.  
- The third cluster (I, C) are on the opposite sides of investment amount 
importance, but all the same putting lots of emphasis on the his risk profile.  
- The remaining three questionnaires (K, L, G) are scattered across the axes, which 
relates the fact that, at the end of the day, the questionnaires are not homogenous 
across the companies.  
The results of these analysis shows that the companies have not taken slightly MiFID’s 
indications when building their questionnaires. Both analyses have emphasized a high level 
of compliance of the questionnaires, both by Italian and French companies, with MiFID 
clauses, also reporting that the companies went a further, requesting information not even 
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suggested by MiFID as a requirement. This shows that “the financial institutions concerned 
did not settle for doing the minimum to comply with MiFID.” (De Palma & Picard, 2010) 
Even if, at the time, it has been received as an indication of intermediaries effort and 
responsibility to provide a healthy investment advice to their client, it unfortunately shows 
that the directive lack specificity and precision, and must be revised as to fix that.  
In their findings Marinelli and Mazzoli (2011), related to the sample of 14 Italian banks 
report the same finding. According to the descriptive analysis, they stipulate “the 
implantation of the suitability assessment, even though recognized as a common MiFID 
regulator requirement, is applied in a highly variable manner by [the] sample of Italian firm. 
The differences that do exist may stem from fact that supervisors give only a general rule for 
the development of the suitability questionnaire, without providing a unique and shared form, 
in adherence to a prudential regulation approach. As a consequence, each intermediary may 
develop its own suitability questions according to:  
 Business model: the propensity to ask for some information may vary depending 
on the kind of business that characterizes each intermediary; […] 
 Compliance function: the specific question included in the questionnaire may 
also depend upon how the compliance function of the firm interprets the 
regulatory recommendation and the relevance accorded to specific aspects of the 
application law. 
 Competence level of the front office: as front offices are the bridge between the 
firm and the customer in the implementation of the suitability questionnaire, a 
different approach to the development of the questions may also depend upon the 
specific competence of the front offices in terms of technical advice, ability to 
build a relationship and commercial approach to the client  
 A random component that does not depend upon a strategy or rational motivation 
by the firm but just upon erratic occurrence or the behavioral biases in the people 
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assigned to the development of the questionnaires itself “ (Marinelli and Mazzoli 
76, 2011, p. 232) 
 
The same research was, subsequently, made by the Linciano N. and  Soccorso P. in July 
2012, under the CONSOB, Research Division, Economic Research Unit. Their data was fully 
in line with the findings of the 4 scholars mentioned above.  
The authors have based their analysis on 20 questionnaires from Italian financial 




Figure 5.3 Completeness of the suitability of the French investment intermediaries questionnaires 
Source: Self elaborated based on results Linciano N. and  Soccorso P (2012) 
 
 
                                                          
76 “Bank Strategy, Governance and Ratings” book by Molyneux P., section by Marinelli N  and Mazzoli C.  
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As can be seen from the table above, they most compact one was only constituted from 
10 questions, the most complex one – was 47 questions. On average, though, the companies 
settled for a number in the range of 10 – 17 questions. The authors have then proceeded with 
dividing the questionnaires in three areas, as before, then analyze the compliance with the 
second level (L2) of the Directive.  
 
 
Figure 5.4 Number of questions per section 
Source: Linciano N. and  Soccorso P (2012) 
 
The authors then denote that “the questionnaires cover each subject with at least one 
question. All questionnaires do, however, ask at least one question relating to which 
products/services the client is familiar with.” following with “least detailed section is that 
relating to investment objectives: only 13 questionnaires contain (at least) one question on 
risk preferences (objective risk); only 10 refer to the risk profile (subjective risk).” (Linciano 
N. and Soccorso P., 2012)  
The findings of the two authors for this research was in line with the two previous ones. 
Indeed, the questionnaires appear to be not complex, they do not seem to cover all the needed 
areas -  they leave room for subjectivity and error. Also, as the two scholars stipulate “they 
comply with the provisions of the MiFID, and are consistent with the Directive itself, most 
questionnaires are not aligned with the economic and psychological literature; in addition 
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their clarity and comprehensibility are flawed by some linguistic-textual characteristics” 
(Linciano N. and Soccorso P. 2012 p. 36)  
The findings of research papers from all across EU may have been the main reason why 
ESMA in 2012 has published the “Guidelines on certain aspects of the MiFID suitability 
requirements”. The authorities, thus, understood the limitation of the questionnaires and the 
subjectivity with which they were built in every investment company. The guidelines where 
published as a recommendation as ho “how to get your customer better”.  
The main limitations, according to ESMA were related to the fact that the procedure of 
financial strategy advice was inadequate, and in drastic need of change. Moreover, the 
intermediaries were said to inaccurately asses the level of knowledge and experience the 
client presumed to have. Often, they left the assessment of the knowledge to the client itself 
– trusting in one’s self-assessment.  The guidelines specified that the intermediaries have to 
ensure that “the client understands the notion of investment risk as well as the relationship 
between risk and return on investments”78 This is compulsory, as it then stipulates that the 
firm must use comprehensible, indicative examples to  ensure a good understanding of 
market functioning. ESMA then continues sating that the it is the firm who decides the 
suitability of the financial product for the client, never to leave it to client’s subjectivity 
anymore.  
  
                                                          
78 ESMA, guidelines 1 -  Clause 16 
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5.2    An questionnaire’s algorithm 
 
As previously discussed, there is a strong need to assess the risk of the clients prior to 
establish any working relationship with them. The investment companies use the 
questionnaires in order to do so. This will allow them to not only to correctly assign suitable 
investment products for the client, but also to correctly understand the client as a person, its 
objectives and the level of risk to undertake his financial situation etc.  
There is undoubtedly a range of limitations of the questionnaires, bur as of now, it is the 
only working tool the investment companies might use to build a client’s risk profile. The 
financial intermediaries are putting together a puzzle, as to create a overall picture of their 
future client.  The method of directly asking the investor “what is the level of your risk 
tolerance?”79 provides a quite inaccurate, superficial representation due to the investor’s 
subjectivity, over-confidence or other psychometric information. Unfortunately this is the 
case for most questionnaires in the world. 80As discussed in the chapter above - including the 
behavioral data is vital for correctly building a client’s profile.  
As seen from the paragraph 5, the regulators did not provide a questionnaires to be used, 
but only indication as of what precisely to ask of the client. This lead to the fact that banks 
have built their own questionnaires, and also algorithms as of how to interpret the client’s 
answers.  
The standard process of risk profiling is reported as follows: 
                                                          
79 A research of Neuroprofiler based on 504 questionnaires across 50 countries revealed “49% of them evaluated 
risk tolerance directly with the question: “What is your risk attitude?” or “Which option best describes your 
risk attitude?”. Only 54% took loss aversion into account.” Obviously, such a question will most likely provide 
erroneous data to the manager, which will also result in a biased strategy for the client, unsuitable to his risk 
tolerance and risk appetite level – source:  https://neuroprofiler.wordpress.com  
Neuroprofiler  is a French company developing online application, using the behavioral finance to correctly 
determine the client’s risk profile.  
 
80 “131 questionnaires from investment firms and advisers in the United States, and his findings are troubling, 
to say the least. The most troublesome finding is that 11% of the questionnaires […] explicitly asked the investor 
to select a specific risk profile or portfolio” – source: Klement  J (2015) quoting the results of Rice D.F  (2005) 
of his research based on 131 investment firm’s questionnaires from the USA. 
Page | 91  
 
 
Figure 5.5 Number of questions per section 
Source: Klement (2015) 
 
The process of building a working relationship with the client usually starts with defining 
the goals of the client. As per usual the manager will be also have a first discussion with the 
client, prior to filling in the questionnaires, “usually begins with definition and discussion of 
the investor’s situation and the goal(s) that are to be achieved by the investments or 
portfolio.” Klement (2015)  
“Questionnaires, in conjunction with lengthy conversations with the client at the 
beginning of the process, ultimately lead to crucial decisions that will set the boundaries for 
the portfolio” during which “managers should have backup materials and charts to educate 
clients on what is reasonable and to quantify some of the clients’ thoughts about objectives.” 
(Spero, 2000) 
The most difficult it’s the phase number three in which financial intermediaries 
implement a quantitative assessment of the qualitative data. Based on  the responses provided 
by the client, they are assigning a specific Value at Risk (VAR) to the client. It is quite 
enigmatic to understand the mechanism, but for obvious reasons, investment companies do 
not make public such information. 
Define goals
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The companies will use a scoring mechanism to assign a weight for each of the responses 
in the questionnaires. Klement (2015) quoting the findings of Rice, D.F. (2005)81 stipulates 
that the research based on 131 questionnaires from USA investment firms have showed that 
the companies assigned an scored in quite a subjective way. “Scoring was generally done on 
an equal-weight basis, even though some questions might have been clearly more important 
in determining the risk profile than others. Similarly, the confidence an investor had in 
specific answers was ignored in every instance, even though the abstract nature of the 
questions might lead to large variations in confidence levels. Finally, the determination of 
the resulting asset allocation seems to be typically done in such a way as to benefit the 
investment firm rather than the investor. […] When hen all questions in the questionnaires 
surveyed were answered in the most conservative way, the allocation to equities ranged from 
0% to 70%.” 
The fact of attributing the same weight to all the responses is, without doubt, erroneous. 
As can be seen from the chapters above, a person who is nearing the retirement age is less 
eager to take on risks. In addition, the level of income has a great influence on the amount 
the investor is ready to put to risk. Assigning equal weight to age ranges and income ranges 
will result in inaccurate results, and erroneous strategies, which will not reflect the level of 
risk tolerance of the client. An investor with age in between 25-35 years, with a high level of 
income will most likely have a different risk tolerance level rather a 70 years old person, who 
wants to preserve his wealth, thus invest in most secure financial products.  Also the firm 
have to also take into account the cognitive and emotional biases, that will surely have a 
strong impact on the results accuracy.  
Another analysis published in 2014 of the 180 000 brokerage accounts from Canada, 
realized by  Foerster, Linnainmaa, Melzer, and Previtero showed that the advisors had a better 
influence than the investor itself. The authors stipulated that “standard regressions that took 
into account risk tolerance (as indicated by answers to simple hypothetical questions), 
investor time horizon, financial knowledge, income, net worth, age, gender, and occupation 
                                                          
81 Rice, D.F. (2005). "Variance in Risk Tolerance Measurement—Toward a Uniform Solution." PhD Thesis, 
Golden Gate University. 
Page | 93  
 
could explain only 13.1% of the variation in the share of risky assets in investor portfolios. 
When the influence of the adviser was taken into account, the share of variation in risky 
assets that could be explained rose to 31.6%. In other words, the adviser turned out to be a 
more influential factor in the makeup of investor portfolios than the factors typically 
evaluated in a risk-profiling questionnaire. Similar results were obtained for the home bias 
in investor portfolios.” (Klement, 2015) 
As overall, the scholars all over the world, realizing quantitative analysis based on 
suitability questionnaires have reached the same conclusions, that the use of questionnaires 
for determining the level of risk tolerance of the client has proven to be unreliable. “the 
differences in the questionnaires may produce dramatic effects on investors: they could be 
profiled as ‘cautious’ by one financial firm and ‘dynamic’ by another. The differences that 
do exist may stem from the fact that supervisors give only general rules for the development 
of the questionnaire without providing a unique and shared form, in adherence to a 
prudential regulation approach.” 
Regulators all around the globe have received a tremendous amount of complaints 
regarding the erroneous investment strategies and unsuitable financial products. The sane 
authors refers to the UK Financial Ombudsman Service which has received “2,079 
complaints in relation to stock broking and portfolio management, with suitability questions 
being the main cause of problems […] The office of the Ombudsman at FINRA counted 1,283 
complaints about allegedly unsuitable investments between January 2014 and November 
2014” (Klement, 2015). He then stipulates that during the financial crisis, which shook the 
foundations of the world in 2007-2008, has considerably decreased. This might be due to the 
fact that “as long as the investments make money for the investors, suitability issues are not 
noticed or ignored. Once markets start to shake, the fragile foundations of investment advice 
as practiced today start to give way” (Marinelli and Mazzoli  , 2011) 
ESMA related the problem in its guidelines, specifying that “regulators in major EU 
markets have found that up to 90 % of assessments of clients’ risk tolerance, for example, 
were invalid and unreliable, which led to unsuitable investment advice, provided to clients”  
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(ESMA, 2014). The regulators then required that each bank reviewed his questionnaires, 
eliminating the possibility for risk profile mismatching.      
 
5.3  Robo-Advisors: reducing the Financial Advice Gap 
 
In recent years, as the limitations of questionnaires became more evident, there was a 
surge of the robo-advisors. They are threatening to take over the traditional financial 
advisement. According to latest data, the robotic algorithms gained ground, an are expected  
by 2020 to manage more 10% of the global asset.82   
Robo-advisors are defined as “automated investment services that use algorithms to 
manage and allocate people's assets. Robo-advisor software analyzes an individual 
customer's current financial status, risk aversion, and monetary goals, and then recommends 
the best portfolio of stocks available based on that data.”83 
It is believed that, with tine passing by, more and more of the companies will rely on the 
automated systems to provide investment strategies for the clients. Companies have already 
started to implement such algorithms in place. One of such was Bettermen, implemented in 
2008.  The robo-advisors are already substituting the investment managers. 
As of 2015 there can be noticed an increasing trend in implementing the system of digital 
advisement. According to the data, during 2015 in USA more than 44 financial intermediaries 
have implemented a digital advising system:  
                                                          
82 According to Business Insider' Intelligence analysis.  
 
83 Source: http://www.businessinsider.com  
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Figure 5.6 Financial Advice Gap 
Source: BlackRock 
 
 It was to be expected, since the new generation of investors are used to have the 
information needed at their fingertips, just enough that they have a working internet 
connection. This was unthinkable 20 years ago, when there was a strong informational 
asymmetry between the two members: bank manager and investor. The former had access to 
necessary information he needed to provide an investment advice, meanwhile the latter did 
not, hence were strongly uninformed. This changed in the last years – now the information 
is just a click away.  
According to banking regulators, the robo-advisors may be used in determining the 
profile of private investors. The development of robo-advisors platform is left to self-
regulatory organizations. However, the Banking regulators will participate and supervise the 
building of the algorithms. This gives the certainty that there will be no room for subjectivity 
nor manipulation, instead ensuring a certain level of standardization and homogeneity on the 
market.  
The latest years is characterized by the rise of era of “digital advice”. Profiling by robo-
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remotely, by accessing internet. Automated systems will make the market more transparent 
and understandable to investors, reducing the financial advice gap.  
 
Figure 5.7 Financial Advice Gap 
Source: BlackRock 
 
“Digital advisors have a number of different investment philosophies, methods, and 
strategies. The algorithms fueling digital advice vary in terms of sophistication. Algorithms 
can range from a simple or pre-packaged algorithm that builds a single portfolio to a 
complex multi-strategy algorithm that reviews thousands of instruments and scenarios in 
order to construct an aggregate portfolio based on an individual’s current holdings, 
investment horizon, and risk tolerance.” 84 
 The robo-advisor will also follow the same methodology/steps of investment, 
summarized as: first allocate the assets, implement, monitor and adjust if needed. Is the same 
3 step methodology used by investors all across the world, whether individual or institutional.  
As of now, the robo-advisors present an interesting and compelling possibility for both 
financial intermediaries as well as clients. They are easy to implement, quick, give the 
possibility to the bank to provide investment advice via internet and to the client to not be 
forced to physically go to the bank. Their advice will be correct, according to the literature 
                                                          
84 BlackRock Inc. publication on “Digital Investment Advice: Robo Advisors Come of Age” - 2016 
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unbiased transparent but, for all their possibilities, they also offer a range a limitations. 
Specifically, a machine will still not be able to perceive little emotional details the client 
might reveal unwillingly during his discussion with the bank manager. Should the manager 
find a mismatch between client’s words and his behavior – he will have the possibility to 
adjust and change the strategy. The machines, obviously, do not bring is such details.  
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This thesis’ purpose was to analyze the changes between the two Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directives, specifically Directive 2004/39/EC -  referred to as MiFID I, and the 
Directive 2014/65/EU – referred to as MiFID II, which consists of a of Directive itself and 
the Regulation 600/2014 (MiFIR), both of which will come into force on 3rd of January 2018. 
The new Directive’s represents, in fact, a revised version of MiFID I, enlarging its scope and 
coverage, all the while bringing fundamental changes in financial market of the EU, which 
has found to be quite flawed, as the financial crisis of 2007-2008 revealed.  
By implementing the new Directive, the European Regulators focused on filling in the 
gaps left uncovered by the first Directive, ensuring a healthier investment environment for 
market participants. The key changes introduced by MiFID II are related to a) providing an 
increased level of competition in the financial markets which is expected to favor the 
investor; b) establishing a functioning market structure framework with respect to trading 
venues -  RM, MTF and OTF b) homogenize regulations across European Union; c) increase 
market transparency; d) address the issue of Algorithmic Trading and High Frequency 
Trading  
However, the main focus was placed on ensuring an increased level of investors 
protection. The new Directive specifically addresses the suitability and appropriateness 
analyses – two concepts and building blocks of Investment Advice Service provided by 
financial intermediaries. The two aforementioned analyses are vital for providing a sound 
investment strategy and portfolio management.  
    In conducting the analyses, the financial intermediaries are bound to use the 
questionnaires – financial tools for evaluating the client’s ability to bear losses, his risk 
appetite and level of risk tolerance. As previously discussed during the fourth and fifth 
chapter - the findings of many researches regarding the reliability of such questionnaires has 
proven it to be quite low. As stipulated, the lack of specific indications from the regulators 
regarding how to correctly perform the two analyses had a tremendous impact on the results 
Page | 100  
 
accuracy. This has also risen the problem of complete divergence between the questionnaires, 
even of companies working in the same industry. Their contents and structure differs largely 
from one to another – some had only 10 questions, others arrived to over 44, some of them 
are more focused on personal characteristic of the client, other more on the financial 
characteristic. The providers of investment strategies are then obliged to also build their own 
algorithm of understanding a level of risk tolerance to the client. These divergences among 
the questionnaires leave room for error regarding client’s risk profile. A client might be 
profiled as extremely “risk-averse” or by one financial intermediary and as quite “risk-
seeking” by other. This will result in a erroneous investment strategy, and unsuitable products 
advised for investing in. The client might be subject to higher risk than acceptable. Also 
having a unfitting strategy of portfolio management will not allow the clients to reach their 
goals, which will make them unhappy. From a point of view of  company’s reputation – 
there’s nothing that can be more harmful than unsatisfied clients.  
A way of solving the issue might be the financial Regulators who will provide the market 
with a standard questionnaire. With the rise of behavioral finance, questionnaires have to 
become more “broad”, thus include not only questions related to the client’s age and level of 
income for instance, but also include questions related to the investor’s personality. The 
provision of such standardized questionnaire will most likely not be possible, even if it would 
solve many raised issues regarding their reliability. Instead, investment companies prefer to 
either to implement theirs and perfect him under the new requirements, or to use such models 
of questionnaires like Betterment, FinaMetrica or Vanguard’s – which already implement the 
part regarding the behavioral finance, with the effort to provide reliable and trustworthy 
results as as for the company, as well as for the client, increasing his level of protection.  
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Client‘s internal number (NDG) 
(hereinafter just the “Client” )
UniCredit Bank Czech Republic, a.s., 
office at Prague 4 – Michle, Želetavská 
1525/1, Postal Code 140 92, ID No.: 649 
48 242, entered in the Commercial 
Register maintained by the Municipal 
Court in Prague, Section B, file 3608 
(hereinafter just the “Bank”) is obliged 
under the provisions of Act No. 
256/2004 Coll., with its registered on 
Capital Market Undertakings, as 
subsequently amended (hereinafter just 
the “Act”), and in particular by the 
provisions of sections 15h and 15i of 
the Act, to obtain information about the 
Client‘s requisite expert knowledge and 
experience in investing (or, as the case 
may be, his or her financial background 
and investment objectives). The Bank 
does so on the basis of this Investment 
Questionnaire. Information requested 
by the Bank from the Client in this 
Investment Questionnaire will help the 
Bank proceed in the most qualified, 
honest and proper manner, and 
especially in the Client‘s best interest, in 
providing investment services and 
offering investment instruments.
Questions of the Investment 
Questionnaire
For the aforementioned reasons, the 
Bank hereby requests complete, precise 
and truthful answers to the following 
questions. If the Client does not fully 
understand any question or if he or she 
is not certain of its sense or formulation, 




Level of education, professional experience in finance
 YES NO
Have you studied a field that deals with financial services?
Do you have longer (at least 2 years) working experience in financial services?
Annex 3
0 1 2 3 0 1-3 4-6 >6 YES NO
TYPE 1
a) Money market funds
b) Bonds and bond funds
c)  Structured bonds 
and guaranteed funds
TYPE 2
a) Balanced (mixed) funds
b)  Structured certificates (bonus 
certificates, express certificates, etc.)
TYPE 3
a) Shares and share funds
b) Index certificates, ETFs
c)  Financial products issued by insurance 
companies (unit-linked funds)
d) Warrants
e)  Alternative investments 
(hedge funds, etc.)
f)  Other funds (commodity, 
real estate, etc.)
What types of investment services are you using or have you used?
a) Portfolio management/assets administration/assets management
b) Brokerage/placing orders/services of an investment intermediary
c) Investment advisory
Note:  In case of co-ownership, please provide the level of knowledge and number of operations jointly for all co-owners. In case of different values, 
provide the data about the co-owner with the lowest level of knowledge and/or who has carried out th e least number of transactions.
QUESTION 2
Knowledge and experience 
in investing
Knowledge
What do you think 
is the level of your 
knowledge with respect 
to the following 
financial instruments?
(0 = none, 1 = low,




made with the following
investment instruments








For any questions not answered, the Bank will designate the answers as 0 and NO.
NOTES
Annex 4



